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Abstract
This dissertation explores the effect of competition among physicians on the technology diffusion
and treatment choices in health care market. In Chapter 2, I study the effect of competition among
physicians on their use of a new technology for coronary heart disease in Pennsylvania from 2003-
2008: drug-eluting stents in percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) procedures. I use inpatient
data from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4), physician data from
public websites, and hospital data from American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of
Hospitals, and find that competition hastened diffusion of drug-eluting stents (DES) from 2003-
2006, when physicians were quickly adopting the new technology, and hastened abandonment of
DES after 2006, when new information came out revealing problems with DES. I also compare
the competition effect among star physicians and non-star physicians, and find that the effect of
competition is stronger on star physicians than on non-star physicians.
In Chapter 3, I examine the effect of relative strength of competition among providers on
the treatment choices of procedures (coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG) and percutaneous
coronary intervention (PCI)) and the appropriateness of care for coronary heart disease patients
in Pennsylvania from 2000-2008. By using data Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment
Council (PHC4) and hospital service areas (HSAs) from the Dartmouth Alas of Health Care, I
find that in areas where competition among CABG surgeons is stronger than the competition
among PCI physicians, patients are more likely to be treated by CABG surgery. I also find that
as competition among CABG surgeons in an area increases, patients are more likely to be treated
by CABG, with the result that the marginal patient receiving CABG is less clinically appropriate
for CABG.
1
Chapter 1
Competition and Physician Behavior
One of the most important industries in the United States economy is health care, accounting
for nearly two trillion dollars in expenditure annually (Smith et al., 2006). This industry is one
in which competition is a real issue, given the controversy over the effect of competition on price
and quality. Therefore, measuring the effects of competition is increasingly important for analysis
of health care markets. This dissertation studies the effect of competition among physicians on
the quality of the care they provide. In particular, we explore how physician competition affects
diffusion of new technology, treatment choices, and appropriateness of treatment.
People supporting competition in health care argue that competitive health care markets lead
to lower prices, premiums, out-of-pocket payments, and resource use, and to higher quality of
care than do noncompetitive markets (Miller 1996; Baker 2001). In theory, competition aims to
maximize social welfare with the optimal combination of price and quality (Baker 2001). The
success of competitive strategies, however, depends on which insurers, hospital, physicians, and
other participants in the health care system compete with each other and how (Gaynor and
Vogt 2000; Luft, Robinson, Garnick, et al. 1986; Enthoven and Kronick 1989). Some studies
attempt to determine whether health care markets with fewer competitors have higher prices, or
whether competition among health care providers is more likely to occur through service quality
or technological innovation. Other studies focus on evaluating the effects of growth in managed
care on the degree of competition, or on the impact of regulations, antitrust efforts, and other
policies on the amount and effects of competition.
2
CHAPTER 1. COMPETITION AND PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR 3
Hospitals and physicians are the two primary providers of health care and their services com-
prise a large component of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2009, hospital care accounted
for 5.4 percent of GDP, and physician services 3.6 percent of GDP (Martin et al., 2011; Gaynor
2011). These two sectors have been undergoing significant structural shifts over the last several
decades. Table 1.1 presents hospital structure trends from 1987 to 2006, which can indicate that
U.S. hospital markets are highly concentrated and have become even more concentrated over time
(Gaynor 2011). The rise of managed care is the principal factor driving this massive consolidation
(Fuchs 1997): the rise of HMOs introduced aggressive price negotiations between hospitals and
health plans, thereby giving hospitals a strong incentive to acquire bargaining power through
consolidation.
In recent years, there has also been a dramatic increase in concentration in physician markets.
Physicians are moving away from small, independent practices and into larger groups (Berenson
et. al. 2010). From 1997 to 2005, the proportion of physicians in solo and two-physician practices
fell from 40.7 percent to 32.5 percent (Liehaber and Grossman 2007). The fraction of doctors in
groups of more than fifty increased from 30.9 percent in 2009 to 35.6 percent in 2011 (Welch et.
al. 2013).
I study the effect of competition among physicians on quality, in particular on adoption of
new technology and treatment choices, because when prices are regulated, as they are in most
countries, health care providers need to compete on quality to attract patients. Gaynor (2006)
lists reasons why quality in health care markets is so important. First, the effect of health care
quality on an individual’s well-being can be very great, and often will be more important than
the quality of other goods or services. Second, due to the pervasive presence of insurance against
health care expenditures, health care consumers are not exposed to the full expense associated
with their health care decisions. Thus, in the presence of a reduced role for price, quality looms
larger in consumer choice, and serves as an important rationing device. Especially in the case of
beneficiaries of the U.S. Medicare program, price is irrelevant for choice. Medicare pays hospitals
and doctors fixed prices for their services, thus a Medicare beneficiary pays the same amount
regardless of where she obtains service.
We first review findings on the effects of competition among hospitals, because they have been
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the focus of most research on the effects of competition and provide evidence that quality may be
affected by competition.
Hospital Competition and Quality of Care
Before 1996, hospitals primarily competed on price through “wholesale” strategies (i.e., providing
services attractive to managed care plans for large numbers of enrollees) because of Medicare’s
switch to prospective payment for inpatient services in 1983 and the development of the managed
care plans (Devers et al. 2003). Evidence shows that high HMO penetration resulted in greater
price competition and hospital price reduction (Bamezai et al. 1999). By 2001, with slower
growing and less tightly managed HMOs, hospital competition based primarily on price was
diminishing in importance, and the major concern in health care was becoming quality, and the
effect of competition on quality (Devers et al 2003). Studies show that hospitals competed by
duplicating costly equipments and services with better quality to attract physicians and patients,
so it was no surprise to find health care costs to be positively correlated to the level of non-price
competition (Dranove et al. 1986, Joskow et al, 1980, Wilson et al. 1982, Robinson et al. 1985)
Several studies provide evidence on whether competition among hospitals increases quality
(Kessler and McClellan 1999, Growrisankaran and Town 2003; Kessler and Geppert 2005; Shortell
and Hughes 1988; Held and Pauly 1983), particularly for Medicare patients. Kessler and McClellan
(1999) study the impact of hospital market concentration on risk adjusted one-year mortality from
acute myocardial infarction (AMI, i.e., a heart attack) for all non-rural Medicare beneficiaries
with AMI during the period from 1985-1994. They find that risk-adjusted one year mortality
on Medicare AMI patients is significantly higher in more concentrated markets. The results with
regard to expenditures have a somewhat different pattern. Prior to 1991, expenditures were higher
in less concentrated markets, while the reverse is true as of 1991.
In contrast to the Kessler and McClellan (1999) study, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) es-
timate the effects of hospital market concentration on risk adjusted mortality rates for AMI and
pneumonia, for both Medicare and HMO patients. Their approach is similar to that of Kessler
and McClellan, but they define hospital markets using all patients (Medicare, HMO, Medicaid,
indigent and self-pay, and indemnity patients). They find that mortality is worse for Medicare
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patients treated in hospitals with lower Medicare HHIs. The implication is that competition
reduces quality for Medicare patients.
Kessler and Geppert (2005) extend the framework employed by Kessler and McClellan to
consider the impact of concentration on differences in quality of care given patients with different
degrees of illness severity. They examine outcomes (readmissions, mortality) and expense (ex-
penditures, various measures of utilization) and expenditures for high-risk and low-risk Medicare
heart attack patients in highly concentrated vs. unconcentrated markets. High-risk patients are
those who were hospitalized with a heart attack in the previous year, whereas low-risk patients
had no such hospitalization. They find that low-risk patients receive more intensive treatment in
highly concentrated markets, but have no statistically significant difference in outcomes. High-
risk patients, on the other hand, receive less intensive treatment in highly concentrated markets,
and have significantly worse outcomes.
The results of these studies differ, even though they use similar methods to define market con-
centration, but they do not use identical areas, data, and strategies for selecting a sample. These
the opposing results from the studies do not settle the debate over whether hospital competition
truly improves quality or just increases the medical costs, but they do suggest quality may be
affected.
Hospital Competition and Technology Adoption
Factors driving adoption and utilization of new technology are poorly understood, but market
forces may play a significant role. One way in which hospitals have competed for market share
has been through the adoption of new technologies, a phenomenon called the medical arms race
(Porter 2006). Hospitals increase market share by offering access to the best equipment and
facilities to attract physicians. Thus, while technological innovation in medical technology has
been a key driver improving life expectancy (Cutler and McClellan, 2001), it is also a significant
driver of healthcare spending growth in the United States (Newhouse, 1992; Smith et al., 2009).
Most of the studies focus on variation of diffusion across hospitals (Chandra, Malenka and
Skinner, 2014) with the majority studying hospital-level diffusion of high-cost procedures that
are primarily imaging related, such as magnetic resonance imaging and computed tomography
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scanners (Fendrick et al., 1994; Bloom et al., 1991; Baker and Wheeler, 1998; Hillman et al.,
1984). However, Sethi (2014) tests the hypothesis that hospitals existing in more competitive
markets are more likely to adopt endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) for vascular surgery, and
found that greater hospital competition is significantly associated with increased EVAR adoption
at a time when diffusion of this technology passed its tipping point. These results suggested
that adoption of a new technology is not solely driven by clinical indications, but may also be
influenced by market forces.
Physician Competition
Physicians play an important role in health care delivery, medical expenditure, technology adop-
tion, and quality of care. In this dissertation, I focus on the relationship between physician
competition and quality. To pursue better quality, physicians might change their adoption behav-
ior and treatment decisions. Examining the effects of physicians’ market power on their behavior
may be an important step in assessing and controlling the health care market efficiency. The
incentives of physicians to affect their own revenue by shifting services provided to patients is
distinct from hospitals because hospitals are usually paid on a disease basis, and physicians are
usually paid on a fee-for-service basis, earning additional revenue for every procedure performed.
Therefore, the effect of competition among physicians might encourage physicians to make some
decisions to attract more patients.
Measuring competition between physicians is much less well developed than for hospitals due
to the fact that most physicians work in solo practices or in a practice with several physicians, and
it is difficult to identify physician competition within practices or across practices. Existing work
studies competition among clinics or small practices (Hamilton and McManus 2005, Gunning et
al. 2013, Callaway 2010).
There is evidence that market power affects physician pricing behavior. Schneider et al. (2008)
calculate county-specific competition indices for physician organizations and private insurers in
California, and find that competition is significantly correlated with lower prices for physician
services. Baker, Bundorf, and Royalty (2014) use Medicare claims data to create MSA level
measures of competition and merge it to MSA level price data from Marketscan. They find that
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increased competition in physician markets is positively associated with lower prices, across all
specialties. Dunn and Shapiro (2012) address the endogeneity of market structure by creating
a fixed travel time competition index, and find that service prices are higher in less competitive
markets.
The degree of competition in physician markets may also be important to patient health out-
comes. The relationship between competition and quality however has remained unexplored in
physician practice markets despite large increases in concentration. Larger practices have greater
market share and greater opportunity for market power, and could lead to greater coordination of
care between providers and, in turn improve patient outcomes (McWilliams et. al. 2013). How-
ever, Eisenberg (2014) studies data on cardiologists, referring physicians, and patient outcomes
for Medicare beneficiaries who receive percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI), and finds a
plausibly causal relationship between higher levels of concentration and mortality in the mar-
ket for PCI patients. In this dissertation, I focus on three other aspects of health care quality:
technology adoption, treatment choices, and appropriateness of care.
The Effect of Competition among Physicians on Technology Dif-
fusion
In most circumstances, physicians are the key agent in determining whether a patient is treated
with a particular medical technology, suggesting that understanding the forces that affect physi-
cian technology adoption and use is critical to addressing the utilization of medical technology.
Most of the research on physician adoption of new technologies has focused on the effect of physi-
cian characteristics such as age, urban versus rural location, and type of practice (solo/group)
(Freiman, 1985; Hollingsworth et al., 2008). Other studies focus on the influence of star physi-
cians (Burke, Fournier and Prasad 2007; Shinn 2012; Hamilton and McManus 2005), or on the
link between peer effects and technology adoption (Coleman, Katz and Menzel 1966). Discussing
a new technology with colleagues and relying on the experience of early adopters are often the
most important sources for physicians to evaluate the benefits of the technology (Coleman et
al.,1966; Escarce, 1996).
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However, the literature on medical technology adoption and diffusion has largely ignored
the role of physician competition. Callaway (2010) studied the adoption of health information
technology (HIT), and found that the probability of adopting HIT increases with the number
of physicians working at the clinic. However, he only focused on the effects of market size and
economies of scale within clinics or practices, but not on the competition among physicians in a
market setting.
The Effect of Competition among Physicians on Treatment Deci-
sions
The treatment decisions of physicians are of great interest in health care, because they determine
health care appropriateness and physicians’ own revenue. A review of published studies indicated
that, on average, 50 percent of patients did not receive recommended preventive care; 30 percent
did not receive needed care for acute medical conditions, and 40 percent went without necessary
care for chronic conditions (Schuster, McGlynn, and Brook 1998). In United States, two patients
in different locations with the same medical condition can receive drastically different treatments
(Dartmouth Medical School 1999; Jencks et al. 2000), a phenomenon called geographic variation.
Two studies examined geographic variation in the intensity of treatment, and found that
productivity spillovers might increase geographic variation in treatment (Chandra and Staiger,
2007; Skinner and Staiger, 2009), but do not explain how productivity differences developed.
Another possible reason is differences in “social norms”. A social norm is defined as a standard,
customary, or ideal form of behavior to which individuals in a social group try to conform (Young
2007). If social norms are affected by competition conditions, then differences in competition may
help explain geographic variations.
I study whether competition among physicians, or competition between two different types
of physicians who can treat the same cohort of patients, affect treatment choices, possibly by
influencing local norms. These treatment choices determine whether care is appropriate, where
“appropriate” care refers to the right intervention for the right person at the right time and in
the right setting (Enthoven et al., 2005). Therefore, studying competition among physicians is
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important, because the idea of appropriateness of care matches the original goal of research on
competition, which is to determine its effects on the quality of care.
In Chapter 2, I study the effect of competition among physicians on their use of a new tech-
nology for coronary heart disease in Pennsylvania from 2003-2008: drug-eluting stents in percu-
taneous coronary intervention (PCI) procedures. I find that competition hastened diffusion of
drug-eluting stents (DES) from 2003-2006, when physicians were quickly adopting the new tech-
nology, and hastened abandonment of DES after 2006, when new information came out revealing
problems with DES. I also compare the competition effect among star physicians and non-star
physicians, and find that the effect of competition is stronger on star physicians than on non-star
physicians.
In Chapter 3, I examine the effect of relative strength of competition among providers on
the treatment choices of procedures (Coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG) and percutaneous
coronary intervention (PCI)) and the appropriateness of care for coronary heart disease patients
in Pennsylvania from 2000-2008. I find that in areas where competition among CABG surgeons
is stronger than the competition among PCI physicians, patients are more likely to be treated
by CABG surgery. I also find that as competition among CABG surgeons in an area increases,
patients are more likely to be treated by CABG, with the result that the marginal patient receiving
CABG is less clinically appropriate for CABG.
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Table 1.1: Hospital Market Concentration, U.S., 1987-2006a
Year Mean HHIb Changec
1987 2,340
1992 2,440 100
1997 2,983 543
2002 3,236 253
2006 3,261 25
a Source: American Hospital
Association. Data are for
U.S. Metropolitan Statistical
Areas with population< 3
million.
b Herfindahl-Hirschmann In-
dex. Means weighted by
MSA population.
c Total change from the previ-
ous year in the table.
Chapter 2
Diffusion of Drug-Eluting Stents in
PCI Procedures
Abstract
Advances in medical technology are an important contributor to improvements in health care, but
the diffusion of new procedures and technologies among physicians has not been widely studied. In
this paper we study the effect of competition among physicians on their use of a new technology for
coronary heart disease in Pennsylvania: drug-eluting stents in percutaneous coronary intervention
(PCI) procedures. We find that competition hastened diffusion of drug-eluting stents (DES) from
2003-2006, when physicians were quickly adopting the new technology, and hastened abandonment
of DES after 2006, when new information came out revealing problems with DES. We also compare
the competition effect among star physicians and non-star physicians, and find that the effect of
competition is stronger on star physicians than on non-star physicians.
JEL classification: I10; I11; O33
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2.1 Introduction
Technology diffusion is the process by which new technologies replace older ones. In healthcare,
technology diffusion is important for improving the quality of medical care by improving health
outcomes. Most studies on technology innovation in healthcare markets have focused on hospitals’
adoption of specialized facilities or expensive equipment such as magnetic resonance imaging
machines or intensive care units (Schmidt-Dengler 2006; Shinn 2012; Duffy 1992; Baker & Phibbs
2000; Russell 1979; Rapoport 1978). However, while in many circumstances physicians are the key
agent in determining whether a patient receives a given medical technology, decisions by physicians
to adopt new technologies have not been as widely studied. Existing work on physician use of
new technology has focused on the effects of star physicians and of peers on physicians’ adoption
decisions (Shinn 2012; Burke, Fournier &Prasad 2007; Coleman, Katz & Menzel 1966; Amol &
Guy 2009). In this paper, we study the effect of competition among physicians on their use of
drug-eluting stents in Pennsylvania over the period 2003-2008.
Before 1980, most patients with severe coronary artery disease (CAD) would receive coronary
artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery, an open-heart procedure that creates new routes around
narrowed and blocked arteries enabling improved blood flow to the heart muscle (Cutler and
Huckman 2003). However, the introduction of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) in the
late 1970s provided a less invasive method for opening blocked arteries. With traditional PCI,
which is performed by interventional cardiologists and interventional radiologists rather than
surgeons, a catheter with a deflated balloon at its top is inserted into the blocked coronary
artery. The balloon is inflated under high pressure to break down the blockage, which is known
as a stenosis, and then removed. The advantage of PCI is that patients do not require general
anesthesia and are not put on a heart-lung machine, and consequently recover more quickly1. The
disadvantage is that blockage of the arteries may recur to the same or greater degree within three
to six months, and may also result in greater residual angina than for CABG patients2.
PCI was improved by the introduction of coronary stents in the mid-1990s. A bare metal stent
(BMS) is a small metal coil that is inserted in the artery and pushes against the wall of the artery
1Michaels (2002) notes that CABG operations require general anesthesia and typically a stay of four to seven
days in the hospital. It may take up to three months to fully recover from the surgery.
2Residual angina refers to pain or discomfort in the chest.
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to keep it open. The stent is implanted during PCI: when the balloon is inflated, the stent is
imbedded the sides of the artery. However, BMS patients must take medication to prevent blood
clots and restenosis, and these medications, which affect the whole body, may cause some side
effects.
In April 2003 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a new technology, Drug-
Eluting Stents (DES), for general use by U.S. physicians. A DES is a normal metal stent that has
been coated with a drug. The drug-eluting stent is placed into the diseased coronary artery and
slowly releases the drug locally to prevent restenosis. DES is appropriate for all patients and has
been extremely successful in reducing restenosis, as well as the side effects of PCI; Ullman (2012),
for example, showed that drug-eluting stents were associated with lower adjusted mortality risk
in patients aged 85 and older compared to bare-metal stents.
The new stents were adopted rapidly; they accounted for 55% of the coronary stent market by
the end of 2003 (Epstein et al. 2012). However, in September 2006 the FDA issued a statement
saying that there was a significant increase in the rates of death and of myocardial infarction (MI)
as a result of using drug-eluting stents. Some research was also published to suggest that DES
use was associated with higher long-term rates of thrombosis, myocardial infarction, death, and
readmission compared to BMS (Pfisterer et al. 2006;Tung et al. 2006). Physicians responded to
this news quickly: the use of DES rapidly decreased (Krone RJ et al. 2010; Epstein, 2011).
Inspection of the Pennsylvania data from 2003 to 2008 shows the effects of these events. Figure
2.1, which shows the diffusion rate of DES and BMS, suggests two episodes of diffusion, the first
involving quick adoption of DES 2003-2006, and the second episode involving abandonment of
DES3. The percentage use of DES started to decrease in the third quarter of 2006, continued
to fall sharply through 2007 (reaching 60% at the end of 2007) until the first quarter of 2008.
The partial recovery at that time is likely due to the availability of the first second-generation
drug-eluting stents, which showed improved patient outcomes (Stone et al. 2010).
We study the two time periods of diffusion, from second quarter of 2003 to second quarter
of 2006, and from third quarter of 2006 to fourth quarter of 2008, to see whether physician-level
competition affected the diffusion of DES during either the adoption period or the abandonment
3Technological abandonment refers to instances where a technology is replaced by an older, preexisting treatment
alternative or technology (Howard and Shen 2011).
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period. We end our analysis at the end of 2008 because of the introduction of a second-generation
DES at that time, and because after 2008 PCI procedures could be done on an outpatient basis
in Pennsylvania, and we do not have outpatient data.
A challenge for the analysis is creating physician markets so as to measure their competi-
tiveness. To measure competition among physicians, we first create hospital markets using the
variable radius method (Elizinga and Hogarty 1978; Garnick et al. 1987). Then within each
hospital market, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on physicians’ shares
of stent procedures performed in the hospitals in that market. We estimate a fixed-effects model
using variations over time within each physician-market pair, because the fixed-effect model can
address correlated unobservable and endogenous market formation problems (Yang et al. 2014).
We find that competition hastened the diffusion of DES in the first adoption period, and led to
quicker abandonment in the second period when DES was shown to have poor long-term effects.
We also compare the responsiveness of star and non-star physicians to competitive pressure, and
find that competition affected star physicians more strongly than it did non-star physicians.
2.2 Literature Review
The decision to adopt a new technology depends on the benefits to be gained compared to the costs
and risks involved: research shows that firms adopt new technologies faster if technologies have
financial benefits, but that if adopting a new technology requires firms to incur costs, diffusion
may be slower (Hall and Khan 2003). For example, Escarce (1996) found that hospitals with the
greatest potential financial gains from a new innovation would be the ones to adopt it.
Competitive pressure may therefore provide a strong inducement to a firm to adopt new tech-
nology. Theoretical research suggests that competition encourages technology adoption because
firms can copy their competitors’ technology and products (Gotz 1999) and because competitive
firms have a stronger incentive to adopt (Arrow 1962), and empirical work has generally found
that competition encourages adoption of new technology (Levin 1987; Copeland et al. 2010). In
health care, Hamilton and McManus (2005) examined the diffusion of intracytoplasmic sperm
injection (ICSI) among U.S. fertility clinics, and found that clinics located in competitive mar-
kets were more likely to offer ICSI than clinics in monopolized markets, and that ICSI diffused
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faster within competitive markets. Callaway (2010) studied the diffusion of health information
technology (HIT) among small physician practices, and found that the probability of adopting
HIT increased with increased competition. Escarce et al. (1995) studied diffusion of laparoscopic
cholecystectomy among practices, and found that more competitive practices were associated with
earlier adoption and quicker diffusion.
Most studies of individual physicians’ adoption of new technology have focused on the effect
of physician characteristics such as age, location, and type of practice and in particular on the
influence of star physicians (Burke, Fournier and Prasad 2007; Shinn 2012; Hamilton and Mc-
Manus 2005; Freinman, 1985; Escarce et al. 1995). The presence of star physicians, who because
of their training may be quicker to adopt new technologies, may simultaneously decrease the costs
of learning about new technologies for other physicians, and spur them to adopt the new tech-
nologies to keep up with the competition. In these studies, star physicians, who are identified as
those who attended the highest ranked medical schools, or who trained in best-rated hospitals, are
found to influence other physicians’ adoption rates. Other researchers have found that physicians
with higher numbers of academic citations were quicker to use new technology, while its use by
less-cited doctors (non-star physicians) depended significantly on whether or not they interacted
with more prominent peers (star physicians) in the same hospital (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel
1966; Burke, Fournier and Prasad 2007; Shinn 2012).
However, little research exists on the effect of competition among individual physicians on
their technology adoption decisions, and even fewer address technological abandonment either in
health care or non-health care settings (Howard and Shen 2012)4. In this paper, we examine the
effect of physician level market competition on diffusion and on abandonment of new technology
while controlling for the effect of star physicians in each market. Further, we study the impact of
competition on star physicians compared to non-star physicians during both the adoption phase,
and the abandonment phase.
4Howard and Shen (2012) studied technology abandonment, and it was focused on the impact of comparative
effectiveness research not competition.
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2.3 Physicians’ Use of New Technology
We model a physician’s decision to use DES as depending on the benefit they receive compare
to the cost of doing so. The benefit a physician receives is the increase in his utility, which we
model as having both intrinsic and extrinsic values. The intrinsic benefit for adopting DES is
the impact on the physician’s reputation and on his altruistic desire to help his patients achieve
better outcomes. The extrinsic benefit is the additional revenue the physician may receive from
adopting the new technology. Physicians are reimbursed at the same rate for using DES as for
BMS. However, the quantity of patient is likely to change from adopting DES: better outcomes
will increase physician’s reputation, and so attract more patients.
Using DES rather than BMS does not require physicians to learn to use new equipment. The
most costly aspect of adoption is likely to be learning to evaluate whether a patients may be
appropriately treated using DES instead of BMS. As found in the literature, star physicians or
physicians with more experience may be quicker to learn the new technology because their better
training and greater learning capability may lower their cost of learning. Their presence may
reduce learning costs for other physicians as wells.
Competition may affect physicians’ adoption decisions in two ways. First, the effect of new
technologies is usually supported with evidence published in the medical literature. In more
competitive areas, physicians might work harder to stay updated on the evidence about new tech-
nologies, for example, by going to medical conferences, reading medical papers, and attending
study groups, and consequently being quicker to adjust their treatment strategies. Second, physi-
cians may desire to achieve prestige through technology acquisition (Emanuel and Fuchs 2008;
Teplensky et al. 1995). That is, physicians’ use of new technology is affected by their desire to
seem up to date and to have better outcomes for their patients. Having a better reputation and
better outcomes should increase their income (as well as any “warm glow” from better outcomes)
because they can maintain an advantage in getting referrals from other physician and thus treat
more patients. In a more competitive market, both these incentives for physicians should be
stronger: essentially, physicians may be more likely to engage in a “medical arms race” when con-
fronted with competitors. Similarly, physicians in more competitive markets will have a greater
incentive to abandon a technology associated with bad outcomes.
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Star physicians might adopt new technology earlier than non-stars because, with their greater
expertise and better training, they may be more confident sooner about the value of a new
technology, and quicker at risk assessment than are non-star physicians. Star physicians may
also adopt more rapidly to protect or enhance their reputation, and this effect may be more
pronounced in markets where star physicians face tougher competition to attract patients. We
compare the competition effect on star physicians to its effect on non-star physicians, and expect
that the effect on star physicians will be stronger than on non-star physicians in both periods.
2.4 Data and Sample
We obtained inpatient data from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4).
An inpatient record includes a patient’s age, gender, race, zip code of residence, insurance type
(Medicare, Medicaid, Commercial, Blue Cross, or Government), the principal diagnosis code and
secondary diagnoses codes, the principal procedure code and secondary procedure codes, as well
as the license number of the operating physician, and a four-digit hospital identification number.
We selected records for hospitalizations in which the patient has a primary or secondary procedure
code indicating the insertion of BMS or DES (International Classification of Diseases, 9th Edition
Clinical Modification, ICD-9 procedure codes 3606 and 3607, respectively). Our final sample is
229,346 patients, 163,824 treated with DES and 65,522 treated with BMS.
We also developed data on the set of physicians, who were either interventional cardiologists
or interventional radiologists, who performed DES and BMS procedures for patients (aged 18 or
older) in Pennsylvania from April 2003 through December 2008. The data we collected includes
information on individual physicians for each market each quarter. Using public websites5, we
assembled data on each physician’s license number, license issue date, license expiration date,
specialties, first name, last name, years of practice, graduate medical school, and hospital of
residency6.
5Some of this information was kindly provided by Jason Hockenberry. Additional information was collected from
various websites including http://www.licensepa.state.pa.us/;http://www.healthgrades.com/;http://www.castleconnolly.com/;
http://www.beckersasc.com/news-analysis/50-best-hospitals-in-america.html;and http://worldranking.blogspot.com/2008/12/us-
top-30-graduate-medical-school.html
6We also know each physicians gender, but do not use this information, because actually all of the physicians
are male.
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Our physician sample has 384 unique physicians: 324 physicians in the first period and 338
physicians in the second period. The lower bound of physicians case number in one quarter is one.
The total sample has 4,969 observations in the first period, and 3,941 observations in the second
period. Many physicians work in more than one market7, we treat one physician in one market at
each quarter as a separate observation. However, since a physician’s adoption experience in one
market might influence his adoption decision if he works in another market, we test our results
using much larger markets based on the main hospital regions(Philadelphia and Pittsburgh) and
hospital referral regions(HRR) to check robustness of the main result.
We matched the individual patient records to physicians using the physician ID contained in
the inpatient record. Once patients were linked to physicians, we created variables to control for
the average characteristics of the patients treated by each physician each quarter. We also used
the hospital ID number and patients’ zip codes to define physician markets.
The third source of data for the study is American Hospital Association (AHA)Annual Survey
of Hospitals, which contains information on hospital bed size, and on whether the hospital is a
teaching hospital8. We linked the AHA hospital identification number with the PHC4 hospital
identifier using a link file, and merged AHA data with PHC4 data.
2.5 Empirical Approach
We first use our patient sample to estimate the effect of competition among physicians on patients’
probability of receiving a drug-eluting stent. We estimate this specification first to generate a big
picture of the effect of competition on the probability of being treated by DES from 2003-2008,
and to show that these effects change after the evidence of bad outcomes was published. The
individual patient sample enables us to explore indirectly the effect of technology diffusion as
result of competition among physicians, that is, to examine how patients’ probability of receiving
DES was affected by competition among physicians. We then study why patients’ probability of
treated with DES changed more directly by examining the effect of competition on each physician’s
7From 2003-2006, 60.6% of physicians practice in more than one market; from 2006-2008, 58.5% of physicians
practice in more than one market.
8We also know whether a hospital is for-profit or private not-for-profit, but do not use these information, because
almost all hospitals in Pennsylvania are private not-for-profit (96.6%).
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use of the new technology during the two time periods, April 2003 - June 2006 and July 2006
December 2008.
Competition and the Probability of DES for Individual Patients
We first estimate the following logistic model using patient-level data from the entire period,
2003-2008:
DESp,i,h,t = α1(Most competitiveh,t × Post1) + α2(Competitiveh,t × Post1) +
β1(Most competitiveh,t × Post2) + β2(Competitiveh,t × Post2) +
θ1Patientp,h,t + θ2Phyp,h,t + θ3Hosph,t + θ4Mkth,t +
γi + µh + δt + p,i,h,t (2.1)
where p is patient, i is physician, h is hospital, and t is quarter. DESp,i,h,t is a dummy variable
that equals one if the patient was treated with DES; Post1 equals one if the procedure occurred
during the period April 2003 through September 2006; Post2 equals one if the procedure occurred
during the period September 2006 through December 2008. Patientp,h,t is a vector of patient char-
acteristics; Phyp,h,t, Hosph,t, and Mkth,t are characteristics of the patient’s physician, hospital,
and physician market; and γi, µh, and δt are physician, hospital, and quarter fixed effects.
Most competitiveh,t and Competitiveh,t are measures of competition among physicians. Ide-
ally we would measure physician-level competition based on clinic or practice locations, because
each physician only serves in one practice or clinic. Without this information, we must use other
geographic bases to create markets, and we must assume that each individual physician competes
with all others whether in or not in the same practice or clinic.
We first identify hospital markets using the variable radius method, which specifies a hospital’s
relevant geographic market as a circular area around the hospital that is the source of 75 percent
of that hospital’s patient flows, based on patients’ zip codes; other hospitals within the hospital’s
circular area are considered to be relevant competitors (Elizinga and Hogarty 1978; Garnick et
al. 1987). We then measure physician concentration within each hospital market based on a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated as the sum of squares of each physician’s
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share of stent procedures performed at the hospitals in the market where the hospital that they
use is located. That is, we identify competing physicians as those that perform PCIs at all the
hospitals in the physician’s hospital’s market.
We convert our continuous measure of physician competition into dummy variables based on
the distribution of physician HHIs in all years of the sample period. The least competitive markets
are those where a physician’s HHI falls within the first tercile of the distribution; a physician is
located in a “competitive” market if his market’s HHI falls within the second tercile of the HHI
distribution, and in a “most competitive” market if the HHI falls within the third tercile of the
distribution. We use the least competitive markets as the reference group.
The coefficient estimates α1, α2, β1, and β2 thus measure the effect of competition among
physicians on a patient’s probability of being treated with DES before and after 2006. Positive
estimates of α1 and α2 imply that during the first period, patients in more competitive markets
were more likely to be treated with DES than were patients in the least competitive markets.
Negative estimates of β1 and β2 indicate that during the second period, patients in more compet-
itive markets were less likely to be treated with DES than were patients in the least competitive
markets.
Patientp,h,t is a vector of patient characteristics controlling age, gender, insurance type, and
severity. We measure severity with two Charlson indices, a measure of the likelihood that a
patient will die, for each patient. The first index uses a patient’s diagnosis codes at admission.
The second index uses codes for any hospital visits made by the patient in the four quarters prior
to their admission for PCI, and these act as measures of general health, as they reflect a wider
range of health issues, such as diabetes, while the Charlson index at admission controls for the
severity of patient’s heart problems at that time. Values for the Charlson index variable range
from zero (the patient is in relatively good health) to 2 (the patient is very severely ill).
Phyp,h,t represents two variables: whether the patient’s physician was a star, and the physi-
cian’s years of experience. We follow the previous literature (Shinn 2012; Burke, Fournier and
Frasad 2007) and define a physician as a star if he meets any of the following criteria: (i) grad-
uated from a top 30 medical school (ii) completed residency training at one of the U.S. News
& World Report’s, or (iii) is included in Castle & Connolly’s Top Docs publications during the
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period. We measure experience as the number of years since a physician graduated from medical
school.
Hosph,t measures hospital characteristics: hospital total bed size, and the competitiveness of
each hospital market. We include the measure of competitiveness of hospital market because drug-
eluting stents are generally three to four times more expensive than bare-metal stents (Ryan and
Cohen 2006), and therefore more expensive for hospitals to stock. Use of the new technology may
thus be affected not just by physician competition but also by hospital competition. We calculate
a second Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as the sum of squares of each hospitals share of stent
procedures within its market. We use the distribution of hospital HHIs over the entire sample
period to create three categorical variables to identify the least competitive, competitive, and
most competitive hospital markets.
Mkth,t is a vector of market characteristics: the number of star physicians in each market, the
number of non-star physicians in each market, HMO penetration, the number of AMI patients,
and the amount of hospital competition. The presence of star physicians may hasten adoption
by non-stars if star physician serve as leaders in the market, with other physicians influenced by
their diffusion or abandonment decisions (Burke, Fournier and Prasad 2007).
Finally, greater penetration by HMOs may slow diffusion, because technological change can
increase expenditures, and HMOs were designed to reduce high levels of utilization and spend-
ing (Newhouse1992)9. Since the Pennsylvania Department of Health reports HMO penetration
by county rather than by zip code, we merge the county penetration rates to the physician
market-level data by calculating the share of patients for each county in a hospital’s market, and
then calculating the HMO penetration rate for a hospital and therefore physician market as the
weighted average of the county penetration rates.
We include fixed effects for the physician, for the admitting hospital, and for quarter. The
use of physician fixed effects captures unobserved characteristics of physicians that may be cor-
9Evidence on the influence of HMOs on technology diffusion comes from studies of hospital decisions. Cutler and
Sheiner (1998) studied a wide range of hospital-based technologies and found evidence that hospitals with higher
HMO market shares had slower rates of diffusion of some technologies during the 1980s and 1990s. Baker & Phibbs
(2002) and Baker & Afendulis (2006) found that hospitals located in areas with high HMO penetration were slower
to adopt new technologies (mid-level neonatal intensive care units; percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty
& coronary artery bypass graft surgery) than were hospitals in areas with low HMO penetration. But Baker and
Phibbs (2002) also found that a larger HMO market share was associated with more high-level neonatal intensive
care units, which they explain is because of the cost-effectiveness of these units.
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related with their decision to use DES. For example, physicians with better reviews in Health-
grades10might be more likely to practice in more competitive markets, where they may have
easier access to new medical evidence, and thus be quicker to use or abandon DES. Hospital fixed
effects absorb all time-invariant differences among admitting hospitals that may affect the diffu-
sion pattern. Quarter fixed effects control changes over time that may be affecting the diffusion
pattern.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for physician, patient, market and hospital charac-
teristics between 2003 and 2008. We distinguish between PCIs with DES and PCIs with BMS
across the two study periods. Generally, we have similar characteristics across different procedure
groups and time periods.
2.6 Competition and Physician Choice of Procedure
We use a fixed-effects linear regression to identify the effect of physician market competition on
a physician’s use of DES in the two sample periods. We estimate the following specification:
pdesi,m,t = β1(compm,t) + β2(# of starm,t) + β3(# of nonstarm,t) + β4Expi,m,t +
β5Patienti,m,t + β6Hospi,t + β7Mktm,t + γi,m + δt + i,m,t (2.2)
where i is physician, m is market, and t is quarter. We conduct our study at the level of a
physician-market pair. Each physician working in each market at each quarter is called one
physician-market pair, and is considered to be one separate observation. The dependent variable
pdesi,m,t measures diffusion of DES among a physician’s patients. The key variable compm,t
is the measure of competition among physicians. Control variables include # of starm,t, the
number of star physicians in each market, and #of nonstarm,t, the number of non-star physicians
in each market; Expi,m,t, a measure of physician i’s years of experience; Patienti,m,t, a set of
variables capturing the average characteristics of physician i’s patients; Hospi,t, the size of the
hospital where the physician i practices; Mktm,t, a vector of three market characteristics: HMO
10Healthgrades is a website that provides information about physicians, hospitals and healthcare providers.
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penetration, hospital competition level, and number of AMI patients; and γi,m and δt, physician-
market pair and quarter fixed effects.
The dependent variable pdesi,m,t measures the percentage of a physician’s PCI patients that
receive a drug-eluting stent in each market each quarter. We calculate this percentage each quarter
and for each market in which a physician participates by dividing the number of a physician’s
DES cases by the total number of PCIs done by the physician in each market each quarter. We
use this percentage to measure the diffusion rate because it captures whether the physician has
adopted DES and also its diffusion among the physician’s patients from quarter to quarter.
The variable compm,t is the measure of competition among physicians. We convert the physi-
cian market HHI into three dummy variables: “Least competitive”, “competitive”, and “most
competitive”, using the terciles of the physician HHI distribution over the entire period. We
expect that during the first period physicians in more competitive markets will be more likely
to use DES, while during the second period competition will cause physicians to abandon DES
faster than physicians in the least competitive markets.
The variables # of starm,t and # of nonstarm,t represent the number of star physicians
and non-star physicians in each market each quarter. We expect that more star physicians in
the market will promote quicker diffusion, because other physicians might either imitate star
physicians or learn directly from them about using DES. For the same reasons, we expect that
the presence of star physicians will hasten abandonment in the second period.
Expi,m,t measures a physician’s years of experience. More experienced physicians might adopt
sooner than young physicians in the first period, but be quicker to abandon in the second period,
because experienced physicians may be able to evaluate the effects of the new technology on their
patients more rapidly than less experienced physicians. Furthermore, more experienced physicians
may be more aware of the potential side effects of BMS on their patients and therefore quicker
to adopt the new technology to solve these problems. We expect more experienced physicians to
adopt DES faster in the first period, but to be quicker to abandon it in reaction to the negative
information published in September 2006.
Patienti,m,t captures the average characteristics of a physician’s patients in a quarter: the
average age of patients, percentage of male patients, percentage of white, black or Asian patients,
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average severity level, and the percentage of patients with different types of insurance (Medicare,
Medicaid, and uninsured, with privately insured as the reference group).
We include the variable Hospi,t,the bed size of the hospital where a physician practices. In our
sample, over half of the physicians practice in more than one hospital in a market. We therefore
create a weighted average of hospital size for a physician, using as weights the share of patients
treated in each hospital, when a physician practices in more than one hospital in a market.
Although we are able to control numerous observable characteristics of physicians, patients,
and markets, it is possible that there are some important determinants of the DES diffusion
pattern that we do not observe and that are correlated with competition and with outcomes. For
example, physicians may have different learning abilities which we cannot observe but that may
affect their DES diffusion decision, because those physicians able to master the new technology
more quickly will use the new technology sooner. Further, physicians with similar characteristics
may choose to work in the same market or hospital and therefore bias the estimates. We control
for time-invariant unobservable characteristics by including a fixed effect for each physician in
each market, γi,m, in our model. We also control quarter fixed effects, δt.
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the physicians and for the characteristics of
their patients and markets for the two periods. Overall, characteristics of physicians, physicians’
patients, and markets are similar across the two time periods.
2.7 Effect of Competition on Star Physicians
Finally, we examine whether the influence of competition on adoption decisions differs for star
physicians compared to that of non-star physicians by estimating equation (2.3) again for each of
the two time periods:
pdesi,m,t = θ1(Most competitivem,t × Stari,m,t) + θ2(Competitivem,t × Stari,m,t) +
θ3Most competitivem,t + θ4Competitivem,t + θ5(# of starm,t) +
θ6(# of nonstarm,t) + θ7Expi,m,t + θ8Patienti,m,t + θ9Hospi,t +
θ10Mktm,t + γi,m + δt + i,m,t (2.3)
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Stari,m,t is a dummy variable that equals one if the physician is a star and zero if the physician
is not. For the first period, positive values for θ1 and θ2 imply that competition promotes quicker
use of DES by star physicians than by non-star physicians. For the second period, negative values
for θ1 and θ2 imply that competition promotes quicker abandonment of DES by star physicians
compared to non-star physicians.
As in specification (2.2), Most competitivem,t and Competitivem,t are competition category
variables; # of starm,t is the number of star physicians in market m time t; #of nonstarm,t
is the number of non-star physicians in market m time t; Expi,m,t measures physician’s years of
experience; Patienti,m,t is the vector of physician’s patients’ average characteristics; Hospi,t is
the bed size of the hospital where a physician practices; Mktm,t is a vector of three market char-
acteristics: HMO penetration rate, hospital competition level, and the number of AMI patients;
γi,m is physician-market pair fixed effects; and δt is quarter fixed effects.
2.8 Results
Table 2.3 shows the results of estimating the probability of a PCI patient being treated with
DES(Eq 2.1). The specification includes patient, physician, hospital and market characteristics,
and hospital, physician and quarter fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
physician level. The estimates suggest that during the first period, patients are more likely
to be treated with DES if their physician practices in a most competitive market, while after
September 2006, patients in more competitive markets are less likely to be treated with DES. We
can predict that competition among physicians promotes diffusion of the DES in the first period,
and encourages quicker abandon of DES in the second period, and thus a patient’s probability of
receiving the treatment differs according to the competition among physicians in his area.
Figure 2.2 shows the raw data on trends in physician use of DES by the level of competition
in physician markets. The figure indicates that physicians in the most competitive areas were
quicker to adopt DES from second quarter of 2003 to second quarter of 2006, and quicker to
abandon DES after second quarter of 2006, compared to physicians in less competitive areas.
Table 2.4 shows the results of estimating the physician-level specification (2.2), the specifi-
cation of principal interest. Columns (1) and (2) show results for the first period, and columns
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(3) and (4) show results for the second period. All specifications include quarter fixed effects (13
quarters in the first period, and 10 quarters in the second period). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the physician market level. The key estimated coefficients for the two physician com-
petition variables are reported in the first two lines; the reference group is the least competitive
market.
Examining the results from 2003Q2-2006Q2, we find that physicians in the most competitive
markets have a 0.0941 - 0.1094 percentage point higher diffusion rate compared to physicians
in the least competitive markets. Compared to the mean diffusion rate, physicians in the most
competitive markets are 12.4 percent to 14.4 percent11more likely to use DES. Further, the results
in columns (3) and (4) indicate that physicians in the most competitive markets are 0.1075-0.1165
percentage point quicker to abandon DES compared to those in the least competitive markets,
which compared to the mean diffusion rate, suggests they are 14.2 percent to 15.4 percent less
likely to use DES12.These results imply that competition among physicians hastened diffusion of
DES during the first period, and made physicians more likely abandon it in the second period.
The other estimated coefficients show that physicians in markets with more star physicians
were quicker to adopt DES during the first period and quicker to abandon DES during the second
period, while more non-star physicians in a physician market lead to a significantly slower rate of
diffusion in the first period, and slower rate of abandonment in the second period. These results
confirm those of other researchers, who find that the presence of stars speeds diffusion for all
physicians. Conversely, if the physician works in a market with more non-star physicians, he is
slower to react to new information.
The estimated coefficient for the effect of a physician’s experience shows that physicians with
more experience are significantly quicker to adopt DES in the first period, and significantly quicker
to abandon DES in the second period. The results confirm that experienced physicians are able
to evaluate the effects of the new technology on their patients more rapidly than less experienced
physicians.
The level of competition among hospitals, included in columns (2) and (4), has no influence on
the main results. However, because there is a high correlation between the physician and hospital
11The mean diffusion rate is 0.758, 0.0941÷ 0.758× 100 = 12.4% and 0.1094÷ 0.758× 100 = 14.4%.
12The mean diffusion rate is 0.758, 0.1075÷ 0.758× 100 = 14.2% and 0.1165÷ 0.758× 100 = 15.4%.
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market HHIs, we cannot conclude that hospital competition has no effect, that is, the insignificant
result may be caused by multicollinearity13.
Finally, we find that on average, higher HMO penetration is associated with a slower rate of
diffusion in the first period, which is consistent with the literature (Baker & Phibbs, 2000; Baker
& Afendulis 2006); the coefficient is not significant in the second period. As for insurance type,
we find effects partially consistent with Epstein (2011): physicians with a large share of Medicaid
patients are less likely to use DES in the second period than are physicians with private patients.
However, we find no effects for other insurance types.
Table 2.5 shows the estimates of Eq.(2.3). The specification includes patient, physician, hospi-
tal and market characteristics, and hospital, physician and quarter fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the physician market level. The key estimated coefficients for the combined
effect of competition and star physicians are reported in the first two rows.
We find that competition has a stronger effect on star physicians than on non-stars. The
positive and significant results reported in column (1) show that that star physicians are 0.0488-
0.695 percentage point more likely to adopt DES than non-star physicians in more competitive
markets, indicating that competition promoted quicker adoption by star physicians than by non-
star physicians from 2003Q2-2006Q2, while the results in column (2) show that star physicians
are 0.0206-0.0534 percentage point less likely to use DES in more competitive markets, which
indicate that competition resulted in quicker abandonment by star physicians than by non-star
physicians during the period 2006Q3-2008.
2.9 Robustness Checks
We performed some additional estimations to test the robustness of our principal results. First,
we consider that a physician’s experience in one market of adopting DES might influence his use
of DES in another market, if the physician work in more than one market. To test this hypothesis,
we use three methods to identify larger physician markets, in an attempt to reduce physicians
13A cross-tabulation of physician competition levels and hospital competition levels shows that there is a strong
correlation between the two measures. Of all the least competitive physician markets, 96.27% are also in the least
competitive hospital market. Among most competitive physician markets, 81.33% are in the most competitive
hospital markets.
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appearing in multiple markets.
First, we use the hospital referral regions (HRR) identified in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health
Care as the markets. The Dartmouth atlas divides Pennsylvania into 14 hospital referral regions,
which is a collection of ZIP codes whose residents receive most of their hospitalizations from the
hospitals in that area. In each HRR area, we measure market competition among PCI physicians
using Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) of concentration. We then convert this continuous
measure of the relative competition into three dummy variables based on the distribution of HHI
differences over the entire period 2003-2008. Although the HRR markets are larger than the
original variable radius markets, we still find physicians in multiple markets from 2003-2006, the
average percentage of physicians practicing in more than one market across one quarter is 50.4%,
and from 2006-2008, the average percentage of physicians practicing in more than one market
across one quarter is 49.7%.
Second, since Philadelphia and Pittsburgh areas are major hospital markets with the most
advanced technologies and providers, we create larger markets using the Philadelphia (South-
east counties: Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia) and the Pittsburgh
(Southwest counties: Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Green, Indiana, Lawrence,
Washington, and Westmoreland) regions as two single markets, and use HRRs to identify the
rest of the markets in the state. We still find that from 2003-2006, the average percentage of
physicians practicing in more than one market across one quarter is 46.6%, and from 2006-2008,
the percentage is 46.3%.
Third, because many physicians working in the Philadelphia region might also practice in
Lehigh Valley area, merge counties in the Lehigh Valley (Lehigh counties: Adams, Berks, Cum-
berland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon, Lehigh, Northampton, Perry, and York) into the Philadel-
phia region to create a single market, keeping the Pittsburg region as another single market, and
use HRRs to create the rest of the markets in the state. From 2003-2006, the average percentage
of physicians working in more than one market across one quarter decreases to 29.6%, and from
2006-2008, the percentage decreases to 28.7%. The results in Table 2.6 continue to suggest that
physicians in more competitive areas in the first period will be quicker to adopt the DES, are
quicker to abandon DES in the second period.
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The second way to check the results is to re-estimated specification (2.2) using a subsample
of physicians with at least 15 years of experience (i.e., graduated from medical school more than
15 years ago). We exclude less experienced physicians because they may be low volume providers
and low volume may be correlated with data errors, and because young physicians might take
more risks. However, results in Table 2.7 are consistent with those in Table 2.4, indicating that
excluding physicians with less experience does not affect the diffusion and abandonment trends
on average.
Then, we examine whether the effect of competition that we find might instead be the effect
of physicians’ greater likelihood of practicing in more sophisticated hospitals if the physicians
are located in more competitive markets. Physicians practicing in more sophisticated academic
hospitals will have more opportunity to learn about new technologies and the latest medical
research. Further, a physician may use the knowledge gained in an advanced hospital on his
patients treated at other hospitals and in other markets. We create a new dummy variable to
identify whether a physician had experience practicing in an academic hospital, where we identify
an academic hospital as one that is affiliated with a medical school or university.
Finally, we replace the weighted measure of hospital size with the size of the largest hospital
at which a physician practices. If a physician’s adoption or abandonment decisions are affected
by the resources available at a larger hospital, the physician’s exposure to the technologies in a
large hospital might spillover to his patients at other, smaller, hospitals in that market.
The results in Table 2.8 indicate that our results are unchanged by including these variables:
we continue to find that physicians in the most competitive markets were quicker to adopt and
to abandon. However, we find that after including these new variables, the number of star
physicians in the market does not significantly promote quicker diffusion in the first period, nor
quicker abandonment in the second period. This suggests that the presence of academic medical
centers, not just the presence of star physicians, may influence physician decision-making.
2.10 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of competition among physicians in the diffusion and abandonment
of drug-eluting stents. We use detailed patient level data that includes all PCI patients to create
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a unique physician-level dataset to analyze the effect of competition on physicians’ use of new
technology. The main contribution of this paper is to show that physician competition affects
both technology diffusion and abandonment. We find that in more competitive areas, physicians
are quicker to adopt new technologies and to abandon problematic technologies. The effects
of competition among physicians on the abandonment of DES are stronger than the effects on
the adoption, which suggests that physicians are more sensitive to using a new technology that
may hurt their patients and their reputation. We also find that the effect of competition on star
physicians is stronger than its effect on non-star physicians. Furthermore, our results also indicate
that physicians with more experience are quicker to adopt DES, but quicker to abandon it after
problems using it showed up.
There are several limitations to this study. First, we create physician competition markets
based on the hospital market zip code, rather than physicians’ practice zip code. It would be
preferable to measure physician-level competition using physicians’ practice locations to define
physician markets. Second, our result is based on data from only one state, which might limit
the implications for other states. Finally, beyond controlling for the presence of star and non-star
physicians, we did not examine the possible impacts of peer effects among physicians. For example,
physicians share information and experiences with their peers, and the individual’s decision on
adopting a new technology product might be impacted by the adoption decision of his relevant
peer group.
Physician market structures are likely to change significantly under the Patient Protection
and Affordability Act, because more physicians will be working as salaried employees of hospital
or hospital- owned medical practices (Gottlieb 2012). By affecting competition among physicians,
these changes in market structure may in turn affect diffusion decisions. A future area of research
will be to study how competition among physicians changes under these new arrangements, and
whether diffusion or abandonment rates are also affected.
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Figure 2.1: Diffusion Trend of DES and BMS by Quarters in Pennsylvania, 2003Q2-2008Q4
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Figure 2.2: Diffusion Trends by Competition Levels in Physician Markets in Pennsylvania
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for PCI Patient Sample
2003Q2-2006Q2 2006Q3-2008Q4
PCI with DES PCI with BMS PCI with DES PCI with BMS
Patient treated with DES or BMS (%) 76.46 23.51 69.57 30.43
Physician Market HHI
First tercile (Least competitive) 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38
Second tercile 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.12
Third tercile (Most competitive) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Characteristics of patients (%)
Emergency 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.51
Urgent 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.26
Elective 0.30 0.23 0.31 0.23
Uninsured 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Medicare 0.54 0.60 0.56 0.60
Medicaid 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09
Private Insured 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.28
Charlson Index=0 (before admission) 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.65
Charlson Index=1 (before admission) 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10
Charlson Index=2 (before admission) 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.25
Charlson Index=0 (at admission) 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.14
Charlson Index=1 (at admission) 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36
Charlson Index=2 (at admission) 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.50
Average age 65.10 66.68 65.29 66.88
Male 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.64
Female 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.36
White 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.85
Black 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09
Asian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other Race 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Characteristics of physician (%)
Star (%) 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.38
Years of Practice 21.17 20.24 22.52 21.89
Characteristics of hospital
Bed size 478.70 463.01 481.15 460.87
Hospital HHI 0.43 0.45 0.51 0.49
Characteristics of market
HMO penetration 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.34
Number of star surgeons (mean) 15.86 14.43 13.26 14.25
Sample Size
Observations 98,395 34,079 65,434 31,443
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Physician Sample
2003Q2-2006Q2 2006Q3-2008Q4
Diffusion rate (%) 0.76 0.68
Sample averages for independent variables
Physician Market HHI
First tercile (Least competitive) 0.32 0.24
Second tercile 0.09 0.05
Third tercile (Most competitive) 0.02 0.02
Number of Stars and Non-stars in the Market
Number of star physicians 17.58 16.51
Number of non-star physicians 21.27 19.94
Characteristics of Physician
Star (%) 0.41 0.41
Years of practice 21.23 22.69
Male (%) 0.99 0.98
Average Characteristics of Physician’s Patients
Emergency (Percent) 0.44 0.48
Urgent (Percent) 0.29 0.28
Elective (Percent) 0.27 0.24
Uninsured (Percent) 0.01 0.01
Medicare (Percent) 0.52 0.55
Medicaid (Percent) 0.07 0.08
Private Insured (Percent) 0.38 0.35
Charlson Index=0 (before admission) 0.67 0.69
Charlson Index=1 (before admission) 0.13 0.1
Charlson Index=2 (before admission) 0.2 0.21
Charlson Index=0 (at admission) 0.23 0.38
Charlson Index=1 (at admission) 0.4 0.42
Charlson Index=2 (at admission) 0.37 0.19
Age 64.8 65.44
Male (Percent) 0.64 0.63
Female (Percent) 0.36 0.37
White (Percent) 0.86 0.85
Black (Percent) 0.08 0.09
Asian (Percent) 0 0
Other Race (Percent) 0.05 0.06
Characteristics of hospital
Bed size 485.18 489.54
Characteristics of market
Weighted avg percentage of HMO penetration 0.44 0.36
Hospital HHI 0.42 0.46
Sample Size
Number of physicians 324 338
Observations 4,969 3,941
CHAPTER 2. DIFFUSION OF DRUG-ELUTING STENTS IN PCI PROCEDURES 35
Table 2.3: Probability that a PCI Patient is Treated with DES, 2003Q2-2008Q4a
Competitive * Post1 0.0995*
[0.053]
Most competitive *Post1 0.3838*
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) [0.205]
Competitive*Post2 -0.1701*
[0.087]
Most competitive*Post2 -0.1480**
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) [0.064]
Constant 3.0866***
[0.749]
Observations 186,081
a Post1 is from 2003Q2 through 2006Q2. Post2 is from 2006Q3 through 2008.
Variables controlling for patient, physician, market, and hospital characteris-
tics are included in the specifications, as are physician, hospital, and quarter
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by physician-level are in brack-
ets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Physicians’ Use of DES a
2003Q2-2006Q2 2006Q3-2008Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physician market is competitive 0.0336 0.0497 -0.0599 -0.0662*
[0.037] [0.035] [0.039] [0.040]
Physician market is most competitive 0.0941* 0.1094* -0.1075** -0.1165**
(Omitted category=Least competitive) [0.056] [0.060] [0.048] [0.048]
Number of star physicians in the mkt 0.0029** 0.0032** -0.0105** -0.0114**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of non star physicians in the mkt -0.0016* -0.0018* 0.0061* 0.0064*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004]
Years of experience 0.2098*** 0.2109*** -0.0810*** -0.0821***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012]
Hospital market is competitive -0.0007 -0.0182
[0.077] [0.040]
Hospital market is most competitive 0.0196 -0.0338
[0.080] [0.047]
Weighted average HMO penetration -0.0035** -0.0032* 0.0000 0.0002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
# of AMI patients -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percent of emergency patient -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0469 -0.0473
[0.023] [0.023] [0.030] [0.030]
Percent of urgent patient -0.0122 -0.0123 0.0128 0.0127
[0.024] [0.024] [0.038] [0.038]
Percent of uninsured patient 0.0379 0.0380 -0.1124 -0.1123
[0.084] [0.084] [0.111] [0.111]
Percent of Medicare patient 0.0160 0.0160 -0.0474 -0.0480
[0.025] [0.025] [0.031] [0.031]
Percent of Medicaid patient -0.0267 -0.0269 -0.0867* -0.0867*
[0.034] [0.034] [0.049] [0.049]
Weighted average hospital bed size -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant -3.6251*** -3.6754*** 3.0505*** 3.1046***
[0.285] [0.319] [0.310] [0.338]
Observations 4,969 4,969 3,941 3,941
R-squared 0.320 0.320 0.144 0.144
Adj. R-squared 0.315 0.315 0.138 0.137
a All specifications include the average characteristics of the physician’s patients (age, gender,
admission type severity level at admission, severity level before admission, insurance type), as
well as market characteristics (number of star physicians and non-star physicians), hospital size,
and fixed effects for physician-market pair and quarter. Robust standard errors clustered by
physician market level are in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Effect of Competition on Use of DES by Star and Non-star Physiciansa
2003Q2-2006Q2 2006Q2-2008Q4
(1) (2)
Competitive*Star 0.0695* -0.0206*
[0.038] [0.011]
Most competitive * Star 0.0488* -0.0534**
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) [0.026] [0.024]
Competitive 0.0800 -0.0589
[0.057] [0.044]
Most competitive 0.1290* -0.0930**
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) [0.069] [0.042]
Number of star physicians in the mkt 0.0031 -0.0114**
[0.003] [0.005]
Number of non star physicians in the mkt -0.0020 0.0064*
[0.004] [0.004]
Year of experience 0.2110*** -0.0821***
[0.012] [0.012]
Hospital competition level (Competitive) -0.0091 -0.0188
[0.081] [0.040]
Hospital competition level (Most Competitive) 0.0114 -0.0353
[0.084] [0.047]
Weighted average penetration rate -0.0031* 0.0003
[0.002] [0.002]
# of AMI patients -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000]
Percent of emergency patient -0.0052 -0.0476
[0.023] [0.030]
Percent of urgent patient -0.0127 0.0127
[0.024] [0.038]
Percent of uninsured patient 0.0375 -0.1131
[0.084] [0.111]
Percent of Medicare patient 0.0159 -0.0481
[0.025] [0.031]
Percent of Medicaid patient -0.0269 -0.0875*
[0.034] [0.049]
Constant -3.6710*** 3.1030***
[0.321] [0.337]
Observations 4,969 3,941
R-squared 0.320 0.144
Adj. R-squared 0.315 0.137
a All specifications include the average characteristics of the physician’s patients (age,
gender, admission type severity level at admission, severity level before admission,
insurance type), as well as market characteristics (number of star physicians and
non-star physicians), hospital size, and fixed effects for physician-market pair and
quarter. Robust standard errors clustered by physician market level are in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Sample Restricted to Experienced Physicians ( Experience >15 years)a
2003Q3-2006Q2 2006Q3-2008Q4
(1) (2)
Physician market is competitive 0.0284 -0.0978**
[0.038] [0.042]
Physician market is most competitive 0.1120* -0.1329**
(Omitted category=Least competitive) [0.059] [0.054]
Number of star physicians in the mkt 0.0032* -0.0091**
[0.001] [0.004]
Number of non star physicians in the mkt -0.0033* 0.0081*
[0.001] [0.004]
Years of experience 0.2112*** -0.0784***
[0.014] [0.012]
Hospital market is competitive 0.0055 -0.0135
[0.058] [0.037]
Hospital market is most competitive 0.0157 -0.0119
[0.063] [0.045]
Weighted average HMO penetration -0.0025 0.0008
[0.002] [0.003]
# of AMI patients -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000]
Percent of emergency patient -0.0181 -0.0377
[0.025] [0.033]
Percent of urgent patient -0.0264 -0.0013
[0.027] [0.043]
Percent of uninsured patient 0.0288 -0.2247*
[0.089] [0.126]
Percent of Medicare patient 0.0000 -0.0739**
[0.027] [0.035]
Percent of Medicaid patient -0.0322 -0.1061**
[0.037] [0.054]
Constant -4.2412*** 3.1472***
[0.393] [0.366]
Observations 3,965 3,167
R-squared 0.318 0.150
Adj. R-squared 0.312 0.141
a All specifications include the average characteristics of the physician’s patients
(age, gender, admission type severity level at admission, severity level before ad-
mission, insurance type), as well as market characteristics (number of star physi-
cians and non-star physicians), hospital size, and fixed effects for physician-
market pair and quarter. Robust standard errors clustered by physician market
level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Effect of Exposure to Academic Hospitals on the Rate of Diffusiona
2003Q3-2006Q2 2006Q3-2008Q4
(1) (2)
Physician market is competitive 0.0562 -0.0770**
[0.035] [0.037]
Physician market is most competitive 0.1345** -0.1416***
(Omitted category=Least competitive) [0.056] [0.047]
Number of star physicians in the mkt 0.0033 -0.0068*
[0.003] [0.004]
Number of non star physicians in the mkt -0.0033 0.0066*
[0.002] [0.004]
Years of experience 0.1352*** -0.0645***
[0.010] [0.012]
Hospital market is competitive 0.0193 -0.0022
[0.064] [0.031]
Hospital market is most competitive 0.0307 -0.0098
[0.070] [0.038]
Weighted average HMO penetration -0.0025** 0.0010
[0.001] [0.002]
# of AMI patients -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000]
Percent of uninsured patient 0.0660 -0.1095
[0.089] [0.110]
Percent of Medicare patient 0.0207 -0.0487
[0.025] [0.031]
Percent of Medicaid patient 0.0073 -0.0861*
[0.033] [0.049]
Academic hospital 0.0234 -0.0423*
[0.037] [0.022]
Teaching hospital 0.0341 -0.0445**
[0.029] [0.020]
Size of largest hospital 0.0001** 0.0000
[0.000] [0.000]
Constant -2.0759*** 2.6009***
[0.298] [0.319]
Observations 3,822 3,941
R-squared 0.199 0.146
Adj. R-squared 0.192 0.138
a All specifications include the average characteristics of the physician’s patients
(age, gender, admission type severity level at admission, severity level before ad-
mission, insurance type), as well as market characteristics (number of star physi-
cians and non-star physicians), hospital size, and fixed effects for physician-
market pair and quarter. Robust standard errors clustered by physician market
level are in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Chapter 3
Does Providers Competition Affect
Treatment Choices?
Evidence from Coronary Artery Bypass Graft and
Percutaneous Coronary Intervention
Abstract
Optimal revascularization strategy for cardiac patients has been, and remains, a topic of con-
troversy. Evidence showed that patients with same medical condition can receive dramatically
different treatments. Bu whether relative strength of competition among providers affects these
treatment choices has not been widely studied. In this paper, our data on patients and hospitals
characteristics are from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) and the
American Hospital Association (AHA), and we collected data on physicians specialty from publicly
available websites. We estimate the impact of relative strength of providers competition between
two alternative procedures on the treatment choices, and the appropriateness of treatment. We
find that patients are more likely to be treated by Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) if
CABG surgeons are relative more competitive than Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI)
physicians. We also show that in the CABG surgeons relatively more competitive markets, CABG
surgeons are more likely to treat patients even they are less appropriate for CABG surgery.
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3.1 Introduction
In the United States, two patients with the same medical condition can receive drastically dif-
ferent treatments. Studies have found that geographic location exerts a strong influence on the
choice of treatments and procedures (Burke et al. 2010, Chandra 2007). Yet most analyses of
geographic variations and decisions of treatment choices do not investigate the effects of providers’
competition on their decisions. In this paper, we investigate how competition among providers
affects treatment choices and appropriateness of care.
There are wide and unexplained differences in costs and quality of care among providers and
across geographic areas, a phenomenon called “small area variations”(Burke et al. 2009; Wennberg
and Gittelsohn, 1973). The Dartmouth Atlas Report in 2012 states that locations matters for
patients whose conditions can be treated with elective surgery, and a large body of research has
documented significant geographic variation in the timing, intensity and appropriateness of care
(Wennberg and Gittelsohn, 1973, 1982; Welch et al., 1993; O’Connor et al., 1999; Fisher et al.,
2003; Weinstein et al., 2006; Deyo and Mirza, 2006). For example, Balcker, Buckles and Chandra
(2006) explored the geographic variation in the appropriateness of use of Cesarean Delivery and
found that areas with higher usage rates perform the intervention in medically less appropriate
populations. Chassin et al. (1987) studied the relationship between geographic variation in the
rates of using three procedures, and in the appropriateness of the treatments, and found significant
levels of inappropriate use in high-use areas compared to low-use areas.
Several reasons have been proposed as explanations of the geographic variation. The Dart-
mouth Atlas Report (2012) reports that patients are more likely to receive a surgery if there are
many patients with similar conditions in the area. Recently, several studies have proposed that
specialization in more versus less intensive treatments and resulting productivity spillovers inten-
sify geographic variation in treatment, particularly in the use of technologically intensive medical
care (Chandra and Staiger, 2007; Skinner and Staiger, 2009). Finally, location-specific norms of
behavior may also explain some of the variation. A social norm is defined as a standard, custom-
ary, or ideal form of behavior to which individuals in a social group try to conform (Young 2007).
If norms for medical treatment differ, perhaps because of differences in competitive conditions,
variation in norms could explain variation in care.
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We study the role of competition in causing geographic variation in both treatment choices
and appropriateness. We focus on cardiovascular disease in the paper. Cardiovascular disease
occurs when the arteries supplying blood to heart become narrowed because of the buildup of
cholesterol and plaque on the inner walls. Before 1980s, Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting (CABG)
was an open-heart procedure that creates new routes around narrowed and blocked arteries,
enabling improved blood flow to the heart muscle (Cutler and Huckman 2003). The introduction
of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) in the late 1970s introduced an attraction alternative
treatment for some patients. PCI is a minimally invasive surgery, a balloon or a metal coil is
inserted in the artery and pushes against the wall of the artery to keep it open. These two
procedures provided by different sets of doctors: CABG surgery is provided by cardiothoracic
surgeons (“CABG surgeon”), and PCI procedure is provided by interventional cardiologists or
interventional radiologists (“PCI physician”).
Figure 3.1 shows the trends of CABG and PCI cases in Pennsylvania from 2000-2008. There is
an increase in percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) and a decrease in coronary artery bypass
graft (CABG) surgery volumes in the treatment of coronary artery disease. The trend shows that
PCI has been utilized increasingly and PCI-to -CABG ratio has still shifted significantly towards
more PCI procedures.
In this paper, we study the effect of the relative strength of competition among providers
on treatment choices for non-elective cardiac patients in Pennsylvania from 2000-2008. CABG
is generally preferred for patients with left main coronary artery disease or severe triple-vessel
disease with reduced left ventricular or diabetes, and PCI is generally preferred for patients with
most forms of single-vessel disease when symptoms warrant coronary revascularization, in light of
its lower procedural risk. The choice between PCI and CABG is most relevant for patients whose
coronary artery disease (CAD) lies in between these extremes, namely patients with simple multi-
vessel CAD with most forms of double-vessel CAD, less extensive forms of triple-vessel CAD, and
without left main involvement and diabetes (Bravata et al 2007).
We therefore focus on treatment choices for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) patients with
simple multi-vessel coronary artery disease whose coronary disease is neither too limited nor too
extensive, and either procedure (CABG or PCI) would be technically feasible. We use a logistic
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model to measure the impact of the relative strength of competition among two sets of providers,
CABG surgeons and PCI physicians, on treatment choices for these patients.
We find that if competition among CABG surgeons is stronger than competition among PCI
physicians in an area, patients are more likely to be treated by CABG surgery. We also investigate
whether the relative strength of competition among providers affects clinical appropriateness for
marginal patients, and find that marginal patients treated with CABG surgery are less appropriate
for CABG in areas where competition among CABG surgeons is relatively stronger.
We think this is an interesting inquiry for three reasons. First, existing research studies the
effect of hospital competition on health outcomes, but few study the effects of competition among
physicians or surgeons and how it might affect local treatment norms. Second, most analyses
of competition focus on its effects on the quality of care as measured by outcomes such as in
hospital mortality, a low incidence event. We instead examine the effect of competition on choice
of treatment and on the clinical appropriateness of the treatment choices for individual patients.
Finally, our findings suggest that competition may not benefit all patients equally because of
its effects on treatment selection, thereby potentially resulting in suboptimal care and increased
health care expenditures (Head et al. 2013).
The paper proceeds as follows. Second 3.2 provides a general conceptual framework. Section
3.3 introduces the data and samples. Section 3.4 describes model of relative competition and
the probability of CABG, and reports the estimation results, robustness checks, and falsification
checks. Section 3.5 presents the model of relative competition and the appropriateness of care
and reports the estimation results. Section 3.6 discussion.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
In many situations people rely on norms to guide their behavior, and norms are of particular
relevance in environments where people interact with each other (Schram and Charness 2014).
Norms can be formed by technology innovation, and social interactions may accelerate shifts in
social norms over time initiated by technological change and other shocks (Burke et al. 2010). In
healthcare, local norms are sometimes used to explain differences in treatment choices, and the
norms are likely to be a consequence of local social interaction among physicians. Burke et al.
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(2010) developed a formal model to explain how geographical variations in medical care arise, and
found that the choices of a physician’s nearby colleagues exert an influence on her own choices,
either because of local increasing returns or because of pure conformity effects.
Until the development of PCI, coronary revascularization patients were treated either with
medication or with CABG surgery. PCI provided a less invasive method for opening blocked ar-
teries, and because of new published evidence, and updated guidelines, treatment norms changed,
forcing PCI procedures for less severely ill and pushing the CABG markets toward treatment of
more severely ill patients.
However, other factors might also contribute to the change of the social norms. In our paper,
we consider that social norms may be affected by the relative strength of competition among
providers. There is some evidence that physicians have a target income and they adjust their
practice patterns accordingly (Wennberg 1984). Thus, in more competitive areas, providers are
more likely to fight for more patients to preserve income. However, the number of patients that
providers treat might not only be affected by competition with other providers of the same type.
Competition among other types of doctors who can also treat the same patients might be another
important factor. That is, providers facing more competition from physicians offering competing
treatments may be more willing to treat marginal patients. This competition effect by slowing
the change in local “norms” might slow the process substitution of PCI for CABG.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the idea that the strength of relative competition may affect the treatment
choices for AMI patients. If competition among CABG surgeons is stronger than competition
among PCI physicians, the local threshold might be pushed to the left. Furthermore, if the
threshold varies because of the relative strength of competition, we should see differences in the
clinical appropriateness of patients for these treatment. In particular, in areas where there is more
competition among CABG surgeons than among PCI physicians, CABG surgeons may be more
likely to regularly operate on patients who are as or more appropriate for PCI so as to maintain
their incomes.
We ignore the demand side factors. First, health care consumers are not exposed to the full
expense associated with their health care decisions (Chandra 2012; Gaynor 2006). Second, we
limit our sample to non-elective (emergency and urgent) patients. We exclude elective patients
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because patients’ choices may play a much more important role in selecting procedures if patients
have more time to make decisions based on the risk and recovery period of the surgery. Further,
they might also travel long distance to seek care. However, emergency patients must be treated
without delay, and urgent patients can wait only one or two days, so we think their treatment
choices will be more heavily influenced by providers. (Schuster et al.2009). That is, we expect
that the local “norm”, affected by relative strength of competition among providers, would be
more likely to influence the treatment choices for these non-elective patients.
3.3 Data and Sample
To analyze the probability that a patient is treated with CABG, and the appropriateness of
CABG as a treatment for those undergoing the surgery, we need data on individual patients,
data on individual physicians, and data on individual hospitals. Inpatient data are from the
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4). An inpatient record includes a
patient’s age, gender, race, zip code of residence, insurance type (Medicare, Medicaid, Commercial,
Blue Cross, or Government), the principal diagnosis code and secondary diagnoses codes, the
principal procedure code and secondary procedure codes, as well as the license number of the
operating physician, and a four-digit hospital identification number.
Data on individual physicians and surgeons are from websites1. These data include each
provider’s license number and name; website searches on their names then allowed us to identify
their specialty (cardiothoracic surgeon, interventional cardiologist or interventional radiologist
physician).
The third source of data is the American Hospital Association (AHA)Annual Survey of Hos-
pitals, which contains information on hospital bed size and on whether the hospital is a teaching
hospital2. We linked the AHA hospital identification number with the PHC4 hospital identifier
using a link file, and merged the AHA data with the PHC4 data so that the characteristics of the
relevant hospital are attached to each individual patient record.
1Some of these information were kindly provided by Jason Hockenberry. Additional information was collected
from various websites including http://www.licensepa.state.pa.us/; http://www.healthgrades.com/;
2We also know whether the hospital is for-profit or not-for-profit, but do not use this information, because almost
all hospitals in Pennsylvania are private not-for-profit (96.6%).
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We use the medical markets identified in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care as our CABG
surgeon and PCI provider markets. The Dartmouth atlas divides Pennsylvania into 128 hospital
service areas (HSA), which is a collection of ZIP codes whose residents receive most of their
hospitalizations from the hospitals in that area. Analysis at the HSA level is attractive because
patients can be assigned to an HSA on the basis of their residence rather than the hospital at
which they received treatment, which might be endogenous.
Our study sample includes non-elective AMI patients who have simple multi-vessel cardio-
vascular diseases and that were treated with either CABG or PCI between 2000 and 2008. We
start with all multi-vessel coronary artery disease patients, and eliminate patients with left main
coronary disease, diabetes, or severe multi-vessel disease3, and patients who are not residents of
Pennsylvania. We also exclude patients who are under 18, because treatment of children may be
associated with an extremely severe situation, or need a separate category of care in a children’s
hospital.
During the sample period, a total of 35,071 patients were treated for simple multi-vessel
cardiovascular disease, 13,896 patients with CABG, and 21,175 patients with PCI. Table 3.1
presents descriptive statistics for patients treated with CABG or PCI between 2000 and 2008.
Generally, we have similar characteristics across different procedure groups and time periods.
3.4 Analysis of Relative Competition and the Probability of CABG
We hypothesize that CABG surgeons and PCI physicians might compete for patients, and that
the relative strength of competition affects local treatment decisions. To test the hypothesis, we
first estimate the probability that an AMI patient is treated with CABG in a HSA area as a
function of the relative strength of competition among CABG surgeons and PCI physicians in
that area:
CABGi,j,m,t = α0 + β1COMPm,t + β2PATi,j,m,t + β3HOSPj,t + γm + δt + i,j,m,t, (3.1)
3Primary or secondary procedure code for multi-vessel CABG: International Classification of Diseases, 9th
Edition Clinical Modification, ICD-9-CM 36.12,36.13, 36.14,.36.16; procedure code for multi-vessel PCI: ICD-9-CM
00.66, 00.41,00.42, 0043, 3605. Primary or secondary diagnosis ICD-9-CM for left main disease: 410.11 Primary
or secondary diagnosis ICD-9-CM for diabetes: 250. We excluded patients undergoing concomitant ventricular
reconstruction or pericardial or valve surgery (ICD-9: 35.xx, 37.31, 37.32, 37.35, 37.4, or 37.5).
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The dependent variable CABGi,j,m,t equals one if patient i from hospital j in market m in
year t is treated with CABG, and equals zero if the patient is treated with PCI. γm and δt are
HSA market and year fixed effects.
COMPm,t is the relative strength of providers’ competition in HSA market m at year t. In each
HSA area, we measure market competition among CABG surgeons and among PCI physicians
using Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) of concentration. A provider’s share of PCI (CABG)
cases in an HSA is calculated as the number of his PCI (CABG) procedures in the HSA market
in that year, divided by the total number of PCI (CABG) cases in that HSA market in the year.
The HHI for PCI (CABG) in an HSA market is then calculated as the sum of the squares of
providers’ shares of PCI (CABG) cases in each HSA market in that year, where the summation
is over all PCI (CABG) providers in an HSA market. COMPm,t is then calculated as the HHI
for PCI physicians minus the HHI for CABG surgeons; therefore, a higher value for COMPm,t
indicates that the CABG surgeon market is relatively less concentrated (more competitive) than
the PCI physician market in that HSA that year.
We convert this continuous measure of the relative competition into three dummy variables
based on the distribution of HHI differences over the entire period 2000-2008. The markets where
concentration among CABG surgeons is relatively strongest are those where the HHI falls within
the first tercile of the distribution. A CABG market is relatively “competitive” if the HHI differ-
ence falls within the second tercile of the HHI distribution, and a relatively “most competitive”
CABG market is where the HHI difference falls within the third tercile of the distribution. We
use the markets in the first tercile where concentration among CABG surgeons is relatively strong
compared to PCI physicians as the reference group: we expect that if the CABG surgeon market
is relatively less concentrated (more competitive) in an HSA, patients are more likely to be treated
by CABG.
We also include a number of variables to control for characteristics of the patient and the
patient’s admitting hospital. PATi,j.m is a vector of patient characteristics: age, gender, insurance
type (Medicare, Medicaid, Private), severity level, clinical status at admission, and previous
clinical status. We measure severity with two Charlson indices: a Charlson index is a measure
of the likelihood that a patient will die, for each patient (Charlson et al., 1987). Values for the
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Charlson index variable range from zero (the patient is in relatively good health) to 2 (the patient
is very severely ill). The first index is based on a patient’s diagnosis codes at admission controlling
for the severity of a patient’s heart problems at that time. The second index is based on codes
recorded for any hospital visits made by the patient in the four quarters prior to the quarter of
their admission. The second Charlson dummy acts as a measure of general health, as it reflects
a wider range of health issues, such as diabetes.
We also include other information about the patient’s clinical status at admission with dummy
variables that indicate whether the patient has heart block, artrial fibrillation, hypertension, hy-
percholesterolemia, heart failure, lung disease, stable angina, angina pectoris, or glomerulonephri-
tis at admission. Dummy variables are also included to control for whether the patient had any
of the following clinical problems in the previous four quarters before the quarter of admission:
stroke, heart failure, Myocardial Infarction (MI), unstable angina, peripheral vascular disease
(PVD), diabetes, hypertension, angina pectoris, old MI, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD).
Finally, HOSPj,t represents two characteristics of patient i’s admitting hospital j at year t:
the hospital’s total bed size, and whether the hospital is a teaching hospital4.
Although we are able to control various observable characteristics of patients and admitting
hospitals, it is possible that there may be important determinants of the treatment choices related
to markets that we do not observe and that are correlated with competition and with outcomes.
For example, productivity spillovers across areas might affect treatment choices, or treatment
choices may differ between rural areas and urban areas. We control for time-invariant market-
related unobservable characteristics by including HSA fixed effects, γm, in our model. We also
include year fixed effects, δt, to control time trend effects. Column (3) of Table 3.1 shows the
descriptive statistics for the variables used in regression (3.1). Overall, characteristics of patients
treated with CABG and PCI are similar.
4Hospitals’ teaching status did not vary over the period.
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Estimation Results
Table 3.2 reports the marginal effects of estimating logistic equation (3.1). Column (1) includes
only patients’ characteristics at admission. Column (2) adds the controls for patients’ clinical
status from four quarters before admission and at admission. Finally, we also ran the entire
sample with the “age” variable interacted with all other patient characteristics to control for any
interaction effects; these results are in column (3). Robust standard errors are clustered at the
HSA market level.
The variable COMPm,t is positive and significant: the marginal effects are around 3.3 per-
centage points in all columns. After dividing by the mean probability of CABG, we find that
providers in markets where competition among CABG surgeons is relatively stronger, patients
are 8% more likely to be treated with CABG5. Thus, the results show that patients are more likely
to be treated with CABG if they are in a market where competition among CABG providers is
competitive or most competitive relative to competition among PCI physicians, compared to mar-
kets where competition among CABG providers is relatively less strong. We conclude that the
treatment decisions for non-elective patients who have simple multi-vessel cardiovascular disease
is affected by the pattern of provider competition in an area.
Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of the effect of relative strength of competition on treatment choices,
we re-estimated equation (3.1) using the continuous version of competition to measure relative
competition interact with three time period dummies to address the effect of technology diffusion
shocks. The three time dummy variables are: Pre2003, MidPeriod, and Post2006. Pre2003 is
the dummy variable that includes years from 2000 to first quarter of 2003, MidPeriod measures
years from second quarter of 2003 to second quarter of 2006, and Post2006 measures years from
third quarter of 2006 to 2008.
In late April 2003, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a new version of PCI,
one using drug eluting stents (DES), which was considered a more effective treatment for patients
with cardiovascular disease relative to traditional balloon PCI and bare metal stents (BMS). Thus
5The mean probability of treated with CABG is 0.4, and 0.033÷ 0.4× 100 = 8.2%
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at this time PCI became even more attractive relative to CABG. However, after 2006, clinical
trials indicated that DES was associated with higher long-term rates of thrombosis, myocardial
infarction, death, and readmission, so that CABG was the treatment of choice for patients with
severe coronary arterial disease (Serruys et al., 2009). Figure 3.1 shows the number of DES cases
increases sharply after the 2nd quarter of 2003, and significantly decreases after the 2nd quarter
of 2006.
Table 3.3 shows the results. We find that before 2003, if the competition among CABG sur-
geons is relatively stronger, patients are significantly more likely to be treated with CABG. During
2003 to 2006, when DES quickly diffused, the power of competition among CABG surgeons is
weaker, and the competition coefficients are not significant, which indicates that the new technol-
ogy DES is replacing CABG. However, after 2006, the competition among CABG surgeons affect
the probability of CABG again, but with weaker effect compared to the period before 2003, which
suggests that the information about problems with DES encouraged providers to treat patients
with CABG, but with the creation of second generation of safer DES, the competition effect does
lose strength.
Falsification Checks
We use the entire sample of cardiovascular disease patients to do some falsification checks. First,
we focus on those patients who do not have simple multi-vessel disease, and are therefore only
appropriate for CABG surgery, to see whether the effect of relative strength of competition among
providers will affect the treatment choice. Table 3.4 shows no significant effect for competition,
which indicates that providers will compete for patients only if their patients are feasible for either
CABG or PCI treatment.
Second, we re-estimate equation (3.1) including only elective patients, because elective patients
might participate in treatment choice decision making, and thus relative competition strength
among providers might not have effects on the treatment choices. As expected, Table 3.5 shows
no significant relationship.
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3.5 Analysis of Relative Competition and Appropriateness of Pa-
tients Treated with CABG
We next study whether CABG surgeons in relatively more competitive areas are more likely
to treat patients who are less appropriate for this procedure. We first develop a measure of
appropriateness for each patient by running a logistic regression model for the probability of
receiving CABG based on patients’ characteristics, clinical information, and time fixed effects
(Chandra and Staiger 2007). Specially, we estimate:
CABGi,m,t = G(ϕ0 + ϕ1PATi,m,t + δt) (3.2)
Table 3.6 presents the results of this estimation procedure. The p value of the Pearson χ2
goodness-of-fit test is 0.3567, so we can reject the hypothesis, and conclude that the estimation
fits the model reasonably well. Fitted values from this regression are used as an empirical measure
of clinical appropriateness for this procedure.
We use this measure of appropriateness of a patient for CABG to evaluate the effect of relative
strength of providers’ competition on the marginal patient’s clinic appropriateness level in several
ways. First, we examine a subsample of patients, those who have simple multi-vessel disease but
who are slightly not appropriate for CABG, and to see whether these patients are more likely
to be treated by CABG where competition among CABG surgeons is relatively stronger than
competition among PCI providers. We split the fitted values from equation (3.2) at their median
to yield two equally sized groups; those above the median are deemed appropriate for CABG
surgery and those below are not; we then drop those patients with probability above the median
from the sample. We then split the remaining sample again at its median, and take the upper
half, that is the second quartile of the original sample, as a sample of patients that are slightly
less appropriate for CABG.
We run equation (3.1) on this subsample to estimate the effect of the relative strength of
competition among providers on these marginal patients’ probability of being treated with CABG.
We expect that marginal patients who are slightly less appropriate for CABG might nevertheless
be more likely to receive CABG in areas where competition among CABG surgeons is relatively
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stronger than competition among PCI physicians.
Table 3.7 shows the results. We find that marginal patients who are slightly less appropriate
for CABG are more likely to be treated with CABG if they are in an area where competition
among CABG surgeons is relatively stronger. The result confirms our expectation that providers
compete for patients, and that competition may affect treatment choices.
Second, we follow the approach used in Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999) and Chandra and
Staiger (2007) and estimate a specification explaining the average level of appropriateness of
CABG patients for that procedure in an HSA area:
Appropriatenessm,t = µ0 + µ1 ln( risk adjusted CABG rate)m +
µ2avg pam,t + γm + δt + m,t (3.3)
The dependent variable is a measure of the average appropriateness for CABG surgery for patients
receiving CABG in an HSA area, and is calculated by averaging the fitted values from equation
(3.2) for all patients in an HSA. avg pam,t is a vector of averages of the patient characteristics
variables and patient clinical status variables in an HSA market. γm and δt are HSA fixed effects
and year fixed effects, respectively.
The explanatory variable of interest is the natural logarithm of the risk-adjusted area CABG
rate. The coefficient µ1 measures the difference in mean appropriateness between the average and
the marginal patient receiving CABG (Chandra and Staiger 2007). If average appropriateness
among patients treated with CABG is declining as the CABG rate rises (µ1 < 0), we infer that
the marginal patient treated with CABG was less appropriate than the average patient6.
The results of equation (3.1) give us estimates of the probability that a patient is receiving
CABG as a function of the competition level, patient’s covariates, HSA fixed effects and year fixed
effects. The coefficients on the HSA fixed effect variables from that estimation thus represent the
predicted risk-adjusted CABG rate for each market after controlling for the effects of relative
competition, patient characteristics, and year fixed effects.
The results of estimating equation (3.3) are reported in Table 3.8, with the standard errors
6When “average” is decreasing, “marginal” is less than “average”; when “average” is increasing, “marginal” is
more than “average”. For example, the relationship between marginal cost and average cost.
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adjusted using bootstrap. The estimates in Column (1), which include the relative strength of
competition effects to measure risk adjusted CABG rate, show that the marginal patient is sig-
nificantly 2.58 percentage points less likely to be appropriate for CABG. The result suggests that
in the markets where competition among CABG surgeons is relatively stronger than competition
among PCI physicians, CABG surgeons are more likely to treat patients that are less appropri-
ate, that is, if competition among CABG surgeons is stronger than among PCI physicians, the
threshold in figure 3.2 will be pushed to the left.
Finally, we run another regression to estimate the effect of relative strength of providers’
competition on the average appropriateness level in an HSA, that is, whether in areas with
stronger relative competitor among CABG surgeons, the average patient receiving CABG would
be less clinically appropriate for CABG. To test this insight we estimate:
Appropriatenessm,t = µ0 + µ1COMPm,t + µ2avg pam,t + γm + δt + m,t (3.4)
The dependent variable measures the average appropriateness of patients treated with CABG
in the market m and year t. COMPm,t represents the two dummy variables measuring relative
strength of competition. avg pam,t is a vector controlling for patients’ average characteristics in
market m and year t. γm and δt are HSA and year fixed effects.
The results of estimating equation (3.4) are reported in Table 3.9. In areas where the com-
petition among CABG surgeons is strongest compared to among PCI physicians, the average
appropriateness for CABG decreases by 2.9 percent compared to areas where the difference in
competition strength is smallest7. The result confirms that in areas where competition among
CABG surgeons is relatively stronger than competition among PCI physicians, the average pa-
tients’ appropriateness declines, and the marginal patients treated with CABG are less appropriate
for this treatment.
7The mean appropriateness in the areas is 0.53, and 0.0153÷ 0.53× 100 = 2.9%
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3.6 Discussion
Our results suggest that on average, treatment decisions for non-elective AMI patients are asso-
ciated with relative strength of providers’ competition, and these patients are more likely to be
treated by CABG if competition among CABG providers is stronger than competition among PCI
physicians. Because of the relative strength of competition, marginal patients who are slightly less
appropriate for CABG might be still more likely to receiving CABG in areas where competition
among CABG surgeons is relatively stronger than competition among PCI physicians.
Our results thus make a contribution to the debate on whether and how much competition
is appropriate in health care. Compared to previous work, our study focuses on a different
type of competition. Instead of analyzing hospital competition, we focus on the effect of the
relative strength of providers’ competition on treatment choices. While we find that treatment
decisions are affected, we also find that providers’ decision-making is also affected by the trends
in technology innovation, that is, we find that competition among CABG surgeons has no effect
on treatment choices from 2003 and 2006, which suggests that DES is a leading treatment choice
for coronary artery disease in innovation period, while competition among CABG surgeons has
weaker effect after 2006 when DES was showed to have some bad outcomes.
There are several limitations to this study. First, our result is based on data from only one
state, which might limit the implications for other states. Second, we only study CABG and PCI
treatments, and the relative strength of competition among CABG surgeons and PCI physicians.
The effect of competition might not be the same for other alternative providers and other diseases
(For example, carotid endarterectomy or carotid stenting surgery are alternative treatments for
carotid artery disease). Third, we focus on the relative strength of competition among different
types of providers, but did not examine the possible impacts of competition among the same type
of providers, or peer effects among providers.
This study of treatment decisions and clinical appropriateness has been of great interest.
Empirically, the treatment decision is determined by many factors, potentially resulting in sub-
optimal care and increased health care expenditures. The best way to deliver care is in a way
that promotes communication amongst physicians and other caregivers around the patient in a
timely manner. That is the most appealing to the patients, it is most efficient for the caregivers,
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and it delivers the highest quality care, possibly because of concern about questionable treatment
choices. The concept of a “Heart Team” has become the subject of increasing interest in treating
cardiovascular disease. A Heart-Team includes a consultation and decision-making forum by a
multidisciplinary team (e.g. interventional cardiologist and a cardiac surgeon and other specialists
as needed) (Head SJ et al. 2012). Our results on treatment choices confirm the important role of
heart team concept. In future study, I plan to explore the effect of Heart Teams on health out-
comes for patients, and health expenditures for hospitals and insurance companies. I will further
explore whether the “Heart Team” concept makes any change to the effect of healthcare market
structures.
CHAPTER 3. DOES PROVIDERS COMPETITION AFFECT TREATMENT CHOICES? 57
Figure 3.1: Treatment Choices between CABG and PCI
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Figure 3.2: Trends of CABG Surgery and PCI Procedures
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for Non-elective Patients
Variable CABG PCI CABG and PCI
(1) (2) (3)
N=13,896 N=21,175 N=35,071
Dependent Variable 0.40
CABG=1
Independent Variable
Relative Strength of Competition
First tercile (Least competitive) 0.43
Second tercile 0.09
Third tercile (Most competitive) 0.16
Patient characteristics
Emergency 0.76 0.80 0.78
Urgent 0.24 0.20 0.22
Age (years) 69.33 66.23 67.46
Male 0.65 0.61 0.63
White 0.86 0.85 0.85
Black 0.07 0.10 0.09
Asian 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medicare 0.66 0.55 0.59
Medicaid 0.06 0.09 0.08
Private 0.27 0.35 0.32
Charlson Index=0 (at admission) 0.22 0.20 0.2
Charlson Index=1 (at admission) 0.42 0.56 0.51
Charlson Index=2 (at admission) 0.36 0.24 0.29
Charlson Index=0 (previous year) 0.79 0.77 0.78
Charlson Index=1 (previous year) 0.07 0.08 0.07
Charlson Index=2 (previous year) 0.13 0.16 0.15
heart block 0.00 0.00 0.00
Atrial fibrillation on admission 0.21 0.11 0.15
hypertensive on admission 0.48 0.54 0.52
Hypercholesterolemia 0.29 0.44 0.38
Heart failure 0.35 0.23 0.28
lung problem 0.00 0.01 0.00
Stable Angina 0.01 0.01 0.01
Angina pectoris 0.02 0.01 0.01
glomerulonephritis 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stroke history 0.02 0.02 0.02
Heart failure history 0.08 0.12 0.10
MI history 0.04 0.04 0.04
Unstable angina history 0.04 0.05 0.04
PVD history 0.05 0.05 0.05
Diabetes history 0.10 0.10 0.10
Hypertension history 0.31 0.35 0.33
Angina pectoris history 0.02 0.03 0.03
Old MI history 0.07 0.08 0.08
Diabetes history 0.00 0.00 0.10
COPD history 0.10 0.14 0.12
Hospital Characteristics
Hospital bed size 465.242
Teaching Hospital 0.38
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Table 3.2: Probability of Patients Treated with CABGa
Probability of patients treated with CABG
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Marginal Effect Marginal Effect Marginal Effect
CABG Competitive 0.0334*** 0.0332*** 0.0317***
(0.00953) (0.00947) (0.00946)
Most Competitive 0.0335*** 0.0337*** 0.0328***
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) (0.00946) (0.00943) (0.00944)
Patients’ history clinical characteristics N Y Y
Intersection terms N N Y
Observations 34,097 34,097 34,097
a Results are from logistic estimate of equation (1). All regressions include year dummy variables,
HSA area dummy variables, and an intercept. We include patients severity level at admission
and four quarters before admission measured by Charlson Index. We also include patients
historical clinical status, and clinical status at admission, and all other patients characteristics.
The dummies for clinic characteristics of the patients: heart block, atrial fibrillation on admis-
sion, hypertensive on admission, hypercholesterolemia on admission, heart failure on admission,
lung problem on admission, stable angina on admission, angina pectoris on admission, histori-
cal heart failure, historical MI, historical unstable angina, historical PVD, historical diabetes,
historical hypertension, historical angina pectoris, historical old MI, historical COPD. Com-
plete results can be provided upon request. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered
at the HSA regional level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Competition Effects with Time Trenda
Marginal Effect
Relative strength of competition*Pre2003 0.173***
(0.0415)
Relative strength of competition*Mid Period 0.0865
(0.0685)
Relative strength of competition*Post2006 0.00892***
(0.00282)
Pre2003 0.0541***
(0.0190)
Mid Period 0.0226**
(0.0112)
Observations 34,097
a Results are from logistic estimate of equation (1). Relative
strength of competition is continuous value of the different be-
tween HHI of PCI physicians and HHI of CABG surgeons.
Pre2003 equals to 1 if from 2000-2003. Post2003 equals to 1
if from 2003-2006. Post2006 equals to 2 if after 2006. All re-
gressions include year dummy variables, HSA area dummy vari-
ables, and an intercept. We include patients severity level at ad-
mission and four quarters before admission measured by Charl-
son Index. We also include patients historical clinical status,
and clinical status at admission, and all other patients charac-
teristics, such as: age, gender, race, insurance type. Complete
results can be provided upon request. The standard errors in
parenthesis are clustered at the HSA regional level.*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Probability of Patients Treated with CABG (Only Appropriate for CABG)a
VARIABLES Marginal Effect
CABG
CABG Competitive -0.0150
(0.00955)
Most Competitive 0.00728
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) (0.0121)
Observations 28,018
a Results are from logistic regression. Sample includes patients who only appropriate
for CABG. All regressions include year dummy variables, HSA area dummy vari-
ables, and an intercept. We include patients severity level at admission and four
quarters before admission measured by Charlson Index. We also include patients
historical clinical status, and clinical status at admission, and all other patients
characteristics, such as: age, gender, race, insurance type. The standard errors in
parenthesis are clustered at the HSA regional level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Probability of Elective Patients Treated with CABGa
VARIABLES Marginal Effect
CABG
CABG Competitive 0.0861
(0.0593)
Most Competitive 0.0681
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) (0.0568)
Observations 3,769
a Results are from logistic estimate of equation (1). Sample includes elective patients.
All regressions include year dummy variables, HSA area dummy variables, and
an intercept. We include patients severity level at admission and four quarters
before admission measured by Charlson Index. We also include patients historical
clinical status, and clinical status at admission, and all other patients characteristics,
such as: age, gender, race, insurance type. The standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at the HSA regional level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Estimation of Appropriatenessa
VARIABLES Coefficient Standard Errors
Gender -0.3308*** [0.029]
Age 0.0062*** [0.002]
White 0.0443 [0.061]
Black -0.0133 [0.075]
Asian 0.4821*** [0.185]
Medicare 0.1859 [0.141]
Medicaid 0.1585 [0.149]
Private 0.0292 [0.142]
Less severe at admission ((Charson Index=1) -0.6701*** [0.040]
Most severe at admission((Charson Index=2, omitted category=Charson Index=0) -0.0800** [0.039]
Less severe previous years(Charson Index=1) -0.0179 [0.053]
Most severe previous years(Charson Index=2, omitted category=Charson Index=0) -0.2270*** [0.048]
Admitting hospital teaching -0.0003*** [0.000]
Admitting hospital total bed size 0.0841* [0.044]
Constant 0.7746*** [0.227]
Patients’ clinical characteristics Y
Observations 34,092
a The specification includes patients characteristics, clinical information and time fixed effects so as to estimate
appropriateness for CABG. Clinical characteristics are: heart block, atrial fibrillation on admission, hypertensive
on admission, hypercholesterolemia on admission, heart failure on admission, lung problem on admission, stable
angina on admission, angina pectoris on admission, historical heart failure, historical MI, historical unstable angina,
historical PVD, historical diabetes, historical hypertension, historical angina pectoris, historical old MI, historical
COPD. The standard errors in brackets are clustered at the HSA regional level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Probability of Marginal Patients’ Treated with CABGa
(1)
VARIABLES Marginal effect
Competitive 0.0413*
(0.0234)
Most Competitive 0.0401*
(0.0240)
Observations 8,367
a Results are from logistic estimate for marginal patients slightly less appropriate for
CABG. We get the subsample from the 2nd quartile of total sample by appropri-
ateness. All regressions include year dummy variables, HSA area dummy variables,
and an intercept. We include patient’s severity level at admission and four quarters
before admission measured by Charlson Index. We also include patient’s historical
clinical status, and clinical status at admission, and all other patients’ character-
istics. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the HSA regional level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Marginal Patient’s Appropriateness for CABGa
(1)
VARIABLES Area’s Appropriateness
Competition effects
ln(CABG rate) -0.0258**
[0.013]
Observations 275
a Estimation results for patients only receive CABG. All regressions include year dummy
variables, HSA area dummy variables, and an intercept. We include average patients char-
acteristics and the share of patients clinical status in each HSA market. The standard errors
in brackets are adjusted using bootstrap. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: Area’s Average Appropriateness for CABGa
(1)
VARIABLES Area’s Mean Appropriateness
Competitive -0.0056
[0.008]
Most Competitive -0.0153*
(Omitted category=Most concentrated) [0.009]
Observations 275
a Estimation results for patients only receive CABG. All regressions include year dummy variables,
HSA area dummy variables, and an intercept. We include average patients characteristics and
the share of patients clinical status in each HSA market. The standard errors in brackets are
clustered at the HSA regional level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conclusion
This dissertation studies the effect of competition among physicians on physicians’ technology use
and treatment decision. In chapter 2, we study the impact of competition among physicians on
the diffusion of the drug eluting stents. By using inpatient data in Pennsylvania who performed
PCI from 2003-2008, we find that competition among physicians will promote quicker diffusion of
DES from 2003-2006, and encourage quicker abandon of DES from 2006-2008. We also compare
the competition effect among star physicians and non-star physicians, and find that the effect of
competition is stronger on star physicians than on non-star physicians. In chapter 3, we estimate
the impact of relative strength of provider’s competition between two alternative procedures on
the treatment choices, and the appropriateness of treatment. We find that patients’ are more
likely to be treated by Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) if CABG surgeons are relative
more competitive than Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI) physicians. We also show that
in the CABG surgeons relatively more competitive markets, CABG surgeons are more likely to
treat patients even though they are less appropriate for CABG surgery.
Compare to the existing research about physician competition and quality of care, this disserta-
tion has several contributions. First, I do not directly study the relationship between competition
and quality (i.e. 30-day mortality), but using technology diffusion and treatment choices behav-
ior to measure quality of care. Second, except for studying competition among the same type of
physicians, in chapter 3 I study relative strength of competition among two types of providers
who can treat the same patients. Third, I study patients with all insurance types (Medicare,
Medicaid, and Private).
There are several limitations of this dissertation. First, we create physician competition mar-
kets based on the hospital market zip code, rather than physicians’ practice zip code. The variable
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radius method that used to create market is based on the actual patient flows, which may be cor-
related with unobservable hospital quality, if patients are willing to travel further for high-quality
care. Second, our result is based on data from only one state, which might limit the implications
for other states. Third, I only study CABG and PCI treatments, and the effect of competition
might not be the same for other alternative providers and other diseases.
Physician markets are likely to change significantly under the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act. Instead of being self-employed, American physicians are becoming directly
employed by hospitals or hospital-owned medical practices. Examining the competition and social
interactions among physicians owned by the same or different hospital systems will be of great
interest. Furthermore, I plan to examine the effects of whether this new market structure is cost
effective by evaluating the impact on the out-of pocket price and health outcomes for patients,
the actual charges paid by insurance companies, and on hospital expenditures and revenues.
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